

1 Jane C. Mariani, SBN 313666  
2 jcm@marianiadvocacy.com  
3 LAW OFFICE OF JANE C. MARIANI  
4 587 Castro Street, #687  
5 San Francisco, CA 94114  
6 (415) 203-2453

7  
8 *Attorney for Plaintiffs,*  
9 THOMAS NEAL MULLINS  
10 JOHN R. SCHOLZ, III

11  
12 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
13 **FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
14 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

15 THOMAS NEAL MULLINS, an  
16 individual; JOHN R. SCHOLZ, III, an  
17 individual; on behalf of themselves and all  
18 others similarly situated,

19 Plaintiffs,

20 v.

21 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF  
22 TEAMSTERS, a labor organization;  
23 TEAMSTERS LOCAL 986, a labor  
24 organization; UNITED AIRLINES, INC., a  
25 Delaware corporation; UNITED AIRLINES  
26 HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware Corporation,

27 Defendants.  
28

Case No. 3:23-cv-03939-EMC

**CLASS ACTION**

**SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT  
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

**SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

1  
2           1.       Plaintiffs, Thomas N. Mullins (“Mullins”) and John R. Scholz, III (“Scholz), by and  
3 through undersigned counsel, as individuals, and collectively (“Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves  
4 and a class of similarly situated people currently or formerly employed as Technicians and Other  
5 Related employees of United Airlines, Inc. (the “Class,” as defined below), bring this action against  
6 the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Teamsters”), Teamsters Local 986 (“Local 986” or  
7 collectively with the Teamsters as “Unions” or “Union Defendants”), United Airlines, Inc.  
8 (“United”), and United Airlines Holdings, Inc. (“UAH” or collectively with United as “United  
9 Defendants” ), complain and allege as follows.

**I.       INTRODUCTION**

10  
11           2.       Plaintiffs bring this class action for claims arising out of the contractual wage reporting  
12 rules and policies agreed to by the parties, within the applicable statutory periods, which have deprived  
13 Plaintiffs and the Class of contractually mandated wages, in an amount exceeding \$100 million dollars  
14 through all Defendants intentional misrepresentation of Letter of Agreement #29 (“LOA #29”)   
15 Adjustment Calculation result as 2.6%, or approximately \$1.20, when the true and correct result was  
16 more than six-times that amount, or 15.7% or on average \$7.35.

17           3.       Plaintiffs allege this unlawful reduction of their wages not bargained for, agreed upon,  
18 and/or ratified by Plaintiffs, or the Class, as is required pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”),  
19 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188. Plaintiffs further allege the governing documents of the Union Defendants,  
20 i.e., the Teamsters’ constitution and the Teamsters Local 986 Bylaws, prohibit such conduct. The  
21 Defendants, through an illicit, secret agreement between them, made up, out of whole cloth, wage  
22 and pay rules and conditions in order to financially benefit the United Defendants in violation of  
23 RLA §§ 151, 152 First, Third, Fourth, and Seventh, and 184; and California Civil Code §§ 1559,  
24 1709, and 1710, causing financial injury to Plaintiffs and the Class.

25           4.       Plaintiffs allege, the Union Defendants, by and through their conduct and role in this  
26 scheme, breached their owed duties of fair representation to Plaintiffs and the Class by using their  
27 position as exclusive bargaining representatives to bring severe financial harm to Plaintiffs and the  
28 Class and in failing to protect them from the illicit wage calculations proffered by United that the

1 Union Defendants knew to be false. In lowering the required raise from approximately \$7.35 to  
2 approximately \$1.20, the Union Defendants acted in an arbitrary, discriminatory, and bad faith  
3 manner under the recognized standards for judging a union's conduct in representing its members.  
4 Such conduct also violates the Union Defendants' own governing documents, i.e., the Teamsters'  
5 constitution, Local 986 bylaws, and the sworn oaths each member takes, by placing the Unions'  
6 interests, and those of the United Defendants, above the interests of Plaintiffs and the Class,  
7 allowing harm to befall Plaintiffs and the Class.

8 5. Plaintiffs attempted to remedy these egregious wage violations, in accordance with  
9 the RLA and the parties' contractual grievance procedures and practices, by timely filing  
10 grievances. However, this process was thwarted and manipulated by the Defendants at every turn,  
11 categorically dismissing all grievances related to this errant and unlawful calculation result as  
12 lacking any merit.

13 6. The Union Defendants not only failed to disclose material, relevant information  
14 truthfully to the Plaintiffs, the Union Defendants refused to take any reasonable action on behalf of  
15 Plaintiffs, failed to perform any meaningful investigation into the filed grievances, and actively  
16 blocked Plaintiffs from completing the grievance process, all of which effectively resolved the  
17 matter entirely in United's favor, to the detriment of Plaintiffs and the Class.

18 7. United refused to provide requested, relevant information related to the grievances  
19 in violation of the RLA, Article 19.E.3 of the CBA, misrepresented facts, refused to accept evidence  
20 and witnesses to support Plaintiffs' grievances, and refused to complete the grievance process with  
21 Plaintiffs.

22 8. Because efforts to resolve this matter through the required contractual processes  
23 have failed to such a degree, and left Plaintiffs' grievances unresolved, Plaintiffs have been left  
24 with no other choice but to seek a judicial forum for a remedy and therefore, bring this action, on  
25 behalf of themselves and the Class, seeking all permissible and applicable damages.

26 **II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

27 9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
28 §1331, because the causes of action arise under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188,

1 presenting federal questions, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1337(a) as this action is a “civil action or  
2 proceeding arising under the laws of the United States, and Acts of Congress, affecting and  
3 regulating interstate commerce.”

4 10. Additionally, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action because  
5 Plaintiffs allege a hybrid action – breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the United  
6 Defendants and breach by the Union Defendants of their owed duty of fair representation to  
7 Plaintiffs and the Class – which presents a federal question pursuant to § 1331 and § 1337.

8 11. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant  
9 to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a), which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over “all other claims that  
10 are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same  
11 case or controversy.” Plaintiffs’ state law claims arise from the same common set of operative facts  
12 as the federal claims, and are sufficiently related to the federal claims with original jurisdiction of  
13 this Court, such that the state law claims form part of the same case and controversy under Article  
14 III of the United States Constitution. Resolving all claims in a single action serves the interests of  
15 judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties.

16 12. This Court also has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
17 §1332(d), the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), because the members from the Class exceed  
18 one hundred (100) members who are citizens of different states than Defendants and the amount in  
19 controversy exceeds the sum of five million dollars (\$5,000,000).

20 13. Venue is proper in this district, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) and (c) because  
21 Plaintiffs are all domiciled in this district, a substantial portion of the events or omissions giving  
22 rise to the claims occurred in this district and all Defendants conduct substantial business, maintain  
23 offices, and employ authorized officers and agents in this district.

24 **III. INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT**

25 14. Pursuant to Civil L. R. 3-2(c) and 3-2(d), this action is properly assigned to either  
26 the San Francisco Division or the Oakland Division because a substantial part of the events giving  
27 rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in San Mateo County and because Plaintiffs reside in  
28 San Francisco County (Plaintiff Mullins) and Alameda County (Plaintiff Scholz).

**IV. PARTIES**

1  
2 15. Plaintiff Mullins resides in San Bruno, California and is employed by United as a  
3 non-exempt aircraft inspector at United’s maintenance facilities serving its airline operations at the  
4 San Francisco International Airport (“SFO”). Mullins has worked for United for almost 40-years  
5 and usually works the overnight shift, from 8:45 p.m. to 7:15 a.m.

6 16. Mullins is a dues paying member in good standing of Local 986, which indirectly  
7 also makes him a member of the Teamsters. Mullins has been a shop steward for Local 986 in the  
8 past and his training for this position included handling and carrying out the grievance process  
9 under the RLA and the CBA.

10 17. Plaintiff Scholz resides in Pleasanton, California and is employed by United as a  
11 non-exempt Hydraulic Mechanical Technician at United’s maintenance facilities serving its airline  
12 operations at the San Francisco International Airport (“SFO”). Scholz has worked for United for  
13 over 25-years and usually works the first shift from 5:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

14 18. Scholz is a dues paying member in good standing of Local 986, which indirectly  
15 also makes him a member of the Teamsters. Scholz has been a shop steward for Local 986 in the  
16 past and his training for this position included handling and carrying out the grievance process  
17 under the RLA and the CBA.

18 19. Defendant Teamsters is an unincorporated labor organization whose purpose is to  
19 represent member employees regarding their wages, terms, and conditions of employment. The  
20 Teamsters share representative duties with its autonomous affiliated local unions for Plaintiffs and  
21 the Class. The Teamsters’ have a principal office and headquarters in Washington, in the District  
22 of Columbia, and regularly conduct and transact business in this district, and throughout California,  
23 in carrying out its duties and activities on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class.

24 20. Defendant Local 986 is an unincorporated labor organization and an autonomous  
25 affiliated local union of the Teamsters. Local 986 shares representative duties for Plaintiffs and the  
26 Class with the Teamsters. Local 986 has its principal office and headquarters in Covina, in the state  
27 of California but regularly conducts and transacts business in this district, and throughout  
28 California, in carrying out its duties and activities on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class.

1           21. Defendant United is an air carrier as defined by, and subject to, the RLA. United is  
2 incorporated in Delaware, with headquarters in Chicago, Illinois. United regularly conducts and  
3 transacts its airline operations in this district, which includes employing Plaintiffs and the Class, in  
4 this district. United is a wholly owned subsidiary of United Airlines Holdings, Inc.

5           22. Defendant UAH is a Delaware corporation and the parent company of United. UAH  
6 regularly conducts and transacts business in this district in operating its wholly owned subsidiary,  
7 United Airlines, Inc.

## 8                                   V. RELEVANT FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

### 9 A. Factual Allegations Common to All Members of the Class.

#### 10 1. General Background.

11           23. Plaintiffs and the proposed class (“Class”), of which Plaintiffs are members and  
12 which is more fully described below, are non-exempt, hourly, collectively bargained employees, as  
13 defined by the Section 202 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 182, and California Labor Code (“Labor Code”)  
14 § 1132.4. Cal. Civ. C. § 1132.4. Plaintiffs and the Class are directly hired by, and employed by,  
15 United. On information and belief, there are approximately 9,600 Class members employed by  
16 United throughout the United States, including approximately 2,500 members employed in this  
17 district, to operate and maintain United’s facilities, planes, and equipment used for its operations.

18           24. At all relevant times, United was an air carrier as defined by the RLA § 181, 45  
19 U.S.C. § 182, and an employer as defined by Labor Code § 1132.2, employing, and continuing to  
20 employ, the Class throughout the United States, including in this district. Cal. Lab. C. § 1132.2.

21           25. At all relevant times, the Teamsters and Local 986 are “labor organizations” as  
22 defined by RLA § 151 Sixth, 45 U.S.C. § 151, which provides a local union and its parent  
23 organization can be “labor organizations” within the meaning of the statute and Labor Code § 1117,  
24 which provides “ ‘labor organizations’ means any organization ... or local unit thereof in which  
25 employees participate, and exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers  
26 concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work ... .”

27           26. As a condition of their employment with United, the Class are required to join  
28 affiliated local unions, currently, the affiliated local unions of the Teamsters.

1           27.     The Class is represented by various autonomous local unions, of which Local 986  
2 is one, that are affiliated with the Teamsters. Each is a bargaining representative or agent of the  
3 Class as is evidenced by the Unions governing documents. True and correct copies of Teamsters’  
4 constitution and Local 986’s Bylaws are attached as “Exhibit 1” and “Exhibit 2” respectively. The  
5 Teamsters’ constitution and Local 986’s bylaws are enforceable contracts between the Unions and  
6 the Class. Moore v. Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 569, 989 F.2d 1534, 1545 (9th Cir. 1993).

7           28.     At SFO, where Plaintiffs are employed by United, there are two affiliated local  
8 unions of the Teamsters for the bargaining unit to which Plaintiffs and certain members of the Class  
9 must belong – Teamsters Local 856 (“Local 856”) and Teamsters Local 986 (“Local 986”) – and  
10 the division between the two local unions, on information and belief, is according to the first letter  
11 of their last name. Accordingly, Plaintiffs were both assigned to, and required to join, Local 986.

12           29.     This split union membership at a single station is unique to SFO. Local 856 and  
13 Local 986, however, often hold themselves out to Plaintiffs and the Class as “TeamstersSFO” or  
14 “TeamstersSFO 856/986,” issuing joint statements, briefings, and updates on negotiations and  
15 administration of the contract; jointly handle grievances, including using the same electronic  
16 grievance tracking system; and sharing offices for their representational duties. There is almost no  
17 discernible division between Local 856 and Local 986 at SFO other than routing of dues monies.

18           30.     Article XIV, § 3 of the Teamsters’ constitution provides in part, “[e]very member  
19 covered by a collective bargaining agreement at his place of employment authorizes his Local  
20 Union to act as his exclusive bargaining representative with full and exclusive power to execute  
21 agreements with his employer governing terms and conditions of his employment.” Exhibit 1, art.  
22 XIV, § 3. Likewise, Local 986’s bylaws similarly provide members of Local 986 authorize Local  
23 986 “to act as his exclusive bargaining representative with full force and exclusive power to execute  
24 agreements with his employer governing terms and conditions of employment” and “in presenting,  
25 processing, and adjusting any grievance, difficulty, or dispute ... .” Exhibit 2, sec. 15.

26           31.     The Teamsters’ constitution directs all officers and officials “to perform its legal  
27 and contractual obligations,” expressly prohibits “doing any act contrary to the best interests of the  
28 Association or its members,” and requires them “at all times, act solely in the interests of our

1 members, devote the resources of [the] Union to furthering their needs and goals, work to maintain  
2 a Union that is free of corruption, ..., and to protect the members' interests in all dealings with  
3 employers." Exhibit 1, art. I, sec. 2; II, sec.2(a); VIII, sec. 1. The oaths taken by all members,  
4 including officers and officials for both the Teamsters and Local 986, require the same. Exhibit 1,  
5 art. II, sec. 2(a); Exhibit 2, sec. 15.

6 32. The Union Defendants were first certified as exclusive bargaining representatives at  
7 SFO for United's technicians in 2008. Following the merger with Continental Airlines in 2010, this  
8 status was confirmed in 2013 of the combined United-Continental technician bargaining unit. As a  
9 result, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to the benefits union membership provides, including  
10 fair representation, which is a substantive check on a union's power in both its negotiation and  
11 administration roles. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Because  
12 the recipient of the RLA's designation as bargaining representative has the responsibility "to  
13 exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile  
14 discrimination against them," an employer cannot rely on, or benefit from, an agreement with a  
15 RLA bargaining representative in which such representative has violated this duty. Steele, at 203.

16 **2. The Parties Contractual Background.**

17 33. At all material times, Plaintiffs and United have been parties to a written collective  
18 bargaining agreement, the "Collective Bargaining Agreement between United Airlines, Inc. and  
19 The Airline Technicians and Related Employees and Flight Simulator Technicians and Related  
20 Employees In the Service of United Airlines As Represented by The International Brotherhood of  
21 Teamsters" (hereinafter "CBA"), made effective from December 5, 2016 through December 31,  
22 2022. A true and correct copy of the CBA is attached as "Exhibit 3."

23 34. The CBA, ratified by narrow margin on December 5, 2016, establishes the wages,  
24 terms, and conditions of employment of United's "Airline Technicians and Related Employees and  
25 Flight Simulator Technicians and Related Employees" (hereinafter "Technicians") of which  
26 Plaintiffs and the Class belong. *See* Exhibit 3.

27 35. The Union Defendants, along with other affiliated local unions, represented  
28 Plaintiffs and the Class in the negotiations for the CBA. Also included as part of the negotiating



1 committee were rank and file members from all affiliated locals across the system, as well as  
2 attorneys and outside advisors including Dan Akins.

3 36. The Teamsters' constitution requires that all local unions bound by a national  
4 agreement must participate in bargaining and, upon the completion of negotiations, shall submit  
5 the agreement to the membership for ratification. Exhibit 1, art. XII, sec. 2(a). Further, Article XIV,  
6 § 3 provides in part, "[e]very member covered by a collective bargaining agreement at his place of  
7 employment authorizes his Local Union to act as his exclusive bargaining representative with full  
8 and exclusive power to execute agreements with his employer governing terms and conditions of  
9 his employment." Exhibit 1, art. XIV, sec. 3.

10 37. "Members shall have the right to ratify the collective bargaining agreement  
11 negotiated by their Local Union ... with their employer." Exhibit 1, art. XII, sec. 1(b). And, have  
12 the right for a similar vote whenever a material change to a collective bargaining agreement will  
13 materially impact a whole group or discrete group of its members. Exhibit 1, art. XII, sec. 2(c), (e).  
14 Local 986's bylaws similarly require "ratification of agreements or amendments shall be subject to  
15 vote ... in accordance with the Constitution and rules adopted by such bargaining group, ... ."   
16 Exhibit 2, sec. 26(C).

17 38. Thereafter, the local union will sign the agreement, generally by the local union  
18 negotiating committee member or other authorized agent, to indicate its intent to be bound. Exhibit  
19 1, art. XII, sec. 2(a). Both the Teamsters, and Local 986 are signatories to the CBA, accepting all  
20 benefits and obligations therein. Exhibit 3, art. 24.

21 39. Any changes to the CBA require RLA Section 106, 45 U.S.C. § 156, bargaining and  
22 notice in addition to, and as directed by the Teamsters constitution, ratification vote for any changes  
23 by the effected membership to be valid. Exhibit 1, art. XII, sec. 2; Exhibit 2, sec. 26(C).

24 40. Article 21.D of the CBA provides that each member will be provided a copy of the  
25 CBA following ratification, which Plaintiff Scholz received sometime in 2017. Exhibit 3. Plaintiff  
26 Scholz also made a written request for the CBA on February 18, 2023, from the Union Defendants,  
27 and again on March 25, 2023. The copy provided to Plaintiff Scholz on or about March 18, 2023  
28 was identical to the copy provided to Plaintiff Scholz in 2017.

1           41. Article 1.A.2 of the CBA provides, “[n]o employee covered by this Agreement will  
2 be interfered with, restrained, coerced, or discriminated against by the Company, its officers or  
3 agents, because of membership in or lawful activity on behalf of the Union.” Exhibit 3, art. 1.A.2.

4           42. The CBA also has a Savings Clause to deem invalid, and to strike, any provisions  
5 found to be violative of the law now or in the future. Exhibit 3, Savings Clause.

6           43. The Teamsters’ constitution also protects Plaintiffs and the Class from agreements  
7 that can, or do harm their interests. Exhibit 1, art. XII, sec. 10. Where information is received that  
8 any agreement affecting a members’ interests in the “working conditions or earnings ... with a  
9 particular company, or otherwise erodes the protections of employee rights embodied in existing  
10 [CBA],” the Union Defendants have the power to “direct” and “refrain from executing such an  
11 agreement, ... .” Id. In such a case, the Union Defendants can take any necessary action to prohibit  
12 any adverse results or actions to its members, including action against any persons or entities  
13 causing such adversely affects to the members. Id.

14           **a. CBA Provision - Grievance Procedures and Practices.**

15           44. The CBA contains a multi-step grievance procedure culminating in final and binding  
16 arbitration of unresolved grievances strictly for interpretation and application of the CBA. See  
17 Exhibit 3, art. 19-20. However, such grievances, and ultimate grievance decisions, cannot “add to,  
18 subtract from, or alter in any way the [CBA], but may only interpret or apply it.” See Exhibit 3, art.  
19 20.F.

20           45. The CBA expressly includes Plaintiffs and the Class as parties who can initiate,  
21 access, and participate in, the grievance process. Exhibit 3, art. 19-20. There are no terms in the  
22 CBA that waive any statutorily provided grievance right or exclude Plaintiffs or the Class from this  
23 congressionally mandated grievance resolution process. See Exhibit 3.

24           46. Section 204 of the RLA provides that when a dispute arises between “an employee”  
25 and “a carrier” and is not amicably resolved, “either party” may unilaterally bring that dispute  
26 before the adjustment board. 45 U.S.C. § 184.

27           47. Local 986 Bylaws authorize it “to act as exclusive bargaining representative with  
28 full force and exclusive power to execute agreements with employers governing terms and

1 conditions of employment” and “presenting, processing, and adjusting grievances arising under any  
2 collective bargaining agreement out of his employment with such employer.” Exhibit 2, sec.  
3 20(E)(2). The Teamsters’ constitution bestows these same powers onto any affiliated local union.  
4 Exhibit 1, art. XIV, sec. 3.

5 48. Local 986 handles grievances for its members such as Plaintiffs, using its officials,  
6 including but not limited to its shop stewards, chief stewards, business agents, and a “Grievance  
7 Committee.” The Teamsters are not involved in the grievance process provided for in the CBA;  
8 however, the Teamsters provide training materials for the local unions to use, such as the Teamsters  
9 Grievance Manual, which Local 986 trains its shop stewards with.

10 49. Local 986 instructs its officials to request information to monitor the employer’s  
11 compliance with the contract, investigate whether a grievance exists, prepare for a grievance  
12 meeting, and to decide whether to drop or prioritize a grievance. These are standard procedures.

13 50. According to Local 986, the scope of information the employer is required to  
14 provide is extremely broad and includes all documents, data, and facts relevant to a grievance or  
15 contract interpretation issue, including but not limited to any bargaining notes; bonus records;  
16 contracts with outside contractors; correspondence; employer manuals, guidelines, and policies;  
17 investigative reports; memos; wage and salary records; or relevant lists, statistics, and data.

18 51. For grievances involving disputed contract language, Local 986 instructs grievance  
19 officials to request an employer’s bargaining notes from the session during which the clause was  
20 negotiated; the dates and contents of any union statements upon which the employer is relying; and  
21 descriptions which the employer claims supports its position.

22 52. Local 986 uses an electronic “tracking” system for handling grievances at SFO.  
23 Only Local 986 officials have access to it. The members cannot access it independently even to file  
24 grievances as members are permitted to do under the CBA.

25 53. Access to the system is also generally limited based on the level of the Local 986  
26 official, i.e., a shop steward can only “access” or “see” First Step matters but a Chief Steward can  
27 “access or “see” First and Second Step. Business Agents for Local 986 can “access” or “see” First,  
28 Second, and Third Steps of the grievance process.

1           54.     Therefore, for a grievant at Local 986 to advance a grievance, up to and including  
2 completion of the Third Step of the contractual remedies, a grievant must seek assistance to do so  
3 from a Local 986 official. The process to do so has been to communicate orally, or in writing, by  
4 email or letter, of a grievant's intent to do so, that the grievant wants to move the grievance forward  
5 in the process. Local 986 then "initiates" the Local 986-only accessible administrative process to  
6 accomplish the advancement of the grievance.

7           55.     This controlled coordinated process is even more acute with respect to the Third  
8 Step System Board of Adjustment ("SBA"). While the CBA states the composition, general  
9 parameters, and projected scheduling of the SBA, it does not provide any necessary details to permit  
10 a grievant to independently access it. Exhibit 3, art. 19.D. The essential details required such as  
11 contact person, telephone number, email address, location, projected schedule, or even who  
12 comprises the SBA, are not stated in the CBA and are not available to the members or a grievant.  
13 Only Local 986 officials with a high enough rank can access such information to initiate referral of  
14 the grievance to the SBA, i.e., a business agent must advance a grievance to the Third Step.

15           56.     And, unlike the CBA provisions for the Board of Arbitration, the CBA does not  
16 contain any needed details to permit a grievant to independently petition the SBA or state what  
17 constitutes a "petition," as provided for in under the RLA. See Exhibit 3, art. 19-20. The practice  
18 has always been for Local 986 to inform United that a grievance was advancing to the Third Step  
19 SBA, after which the particulars regarding where and who would receive petitions, conduct the  
20 hearing, and constitute the panel were decided amongst the participating parties. This is also true  
21 for almost all affiliated local unions representing the Class throughout United's system.

22           57.     The CBA does not provide any process for an employee to remedy violations of the  
23 grievance process either with United or Local 986.

24                   **b.     CBA Provision - Letter of Agreement #29 Industry Reset.**

25           58.     The CBA includes Letter of Agreement #29 ("LOA #29"), which is the agreed upon  
26 objective, standardized method of calculating biennial wage increases for the Class in order to  
27 maintain a compensation level at 102% of the combined average compensation level of their  
28 counterparts at United's two main competitor airlines, American Airlines ("American" or "AA")

1 and Delta Airlines (“Delta” or “DL”) through the use of an “Adjustment Calculation.” *See* Exhibit  
2 3, LOA #29.

3 59. LOA #29 was negotiated and ratified at the same time as the rest of the CBA to  
4 establish an objective, standardized method for raises in order to reduce typical drawn out and  
5 contentious wage negotiations. At the bargaining table for the Class, as is relevant here, were the  
6 Teamsters’ Airline Division officials; Principal Officers and Business Agents from all affiliated  
7 local unions including Local 986; rank-and-file members of all affiliated local unions, including  
8 Local 986; and Dan Akins, the Union Defendants’ economist and actuary.

9 60. LOA #29’s elements, function, and application, were explained in detail in writing,  
10 in video presentations, and during in person meetings, by Akins, to the negotiators and to Plaintiffs  
11 and the Class. Akins repeatedly stated the metrics were finalized and derived from publicly  
12 available sources to allow for the highest level of transparency and ease of actually doing the  
13 Adjustment Calculation. Indeed, due to the comparative analysis requiring the information of  
14 United’s two main competitor airlines, all information being publicly accessible was compulsory.  
15 Notably, several other air carriers use, or have used, a similar mechanism for years in their contracts  
16 to provide for wage increases for their technician employees, including American Airlines, Alaska  
17 Airlines and Southwest Airlines.

18 61. LOA #29, in paragraph 2, describes how the Adjustment Calculation provides the  
19 biennial raise. “If the results of the analysis demonstrate that as of the Measuring Date, UALs  
20 Annual Wages and Benefits is less than 102 percent (102%) of the combined average of Annual  
21 Wages and Benefits under AA CBA [American Airlines CBA] and DL CBA [Delta Airlines CBA],  
22 then UAL shall adjust basic wages effective at the beginning of the first pay period after each  
23 measurement date to be 102 percent of the combined average. If it is determined that a one-time  
24 adjustment will take place, any subsequent pay increases will not take place until such time that the  
25 rates in the original UA CBA exceed those rates in the adjusted scale.” Exhibit 3, LOA #29, para.  
26 2.

27 62. LOA #29, further defines the Adjustment Calculation formula as follows: “Annual  
28 Wages and Benefits” is the sum of Annual Employee Wages, Annual Employee Benefits and Time-

1 off Adjustment for 10, 20 and 30 years of service weighted 20 percent, 60 percent and 20 percent  
2 respectively.” Exhibit 3, LOA #29, para. 1(h).

3 63. LOA #29, Paragraph 1 Definitions, subsections e, f, and g, each provide the  
4 definitions for Annual Employee Wages, Annual Employee Benefits, and Time-off Adjustment,  
5 and how each is calculated. Exhibit 3, LOA #29, para. 1(e), (f), and (g).

6 64. LOA #29 provides for a final adjustment, a “Scope Adjustment,” which is a ratio of  
7 the number technicians and related crafts covered in the CBA per mainline aircraft. Exhibit 3, LOA  
8 #29, para. 1(i).

9 65. On October 18, 2016, the Unions held an informational meeting or “roadshow” at  
10 SFO to explain the CBA rules, terms, and conditions, including LOA #29. At this meeting, Akins,  
11 as a negotiating committee member and economist, provided a comprehensive explanation of LOA  
12 #29, meticulously going over all of its elements, functions, and application, utilizing and providing  
13 a corresponding PowerPoint presentation Akins referred to as a draft of the Cost Model referenced  
14 in LOA #29. A true and correct copy of which is attached as “Exhibit 4.” Akins referred to this first  
15 calculation as the “baseline calculation,” explaining this was done to not only show how the  
16 Adjustment Calculation worked but also the value of the now CBA should the Technicians elect to  
17 ratify the Tentative Agreement. Below is slide 4, an overview of the Cost Model. Exhibit 4.

#### Reset Model Architecture

### Industry Reset Overview

- **Purpose:** The industry reset is designed as a mechanism to ensure that the sum value of United Technician’s primary contract elements remain at least 2% above the average of the same contract elements for Technicians of American and Delta.
- **Timing:** Reset analysis will occur every 24 months after date of ratification over the course of contract, and every 12 months after the amendable date.
- **Mechanism:** A reset model has been created to measure and compare the value of a selected set of primary contractual elements covering pay, benefits, work rules and retirement contribution level for Technician’s at United to that of the average of Technicians at American and Delta. The model’s structure will not change, only the periodic updates of data elements being analyzed will change.
- **Application:** If the results of the reset model indicate that the sum value of the United’s Technician’s contractual elements do not exceed the average value at American and Delta by 2%, the United Technician’s wages will be adjusted upwards by an amount needed to adjust United Technician’s contract value to 2% above the average of DL and AA Technician’s contract.
- **One-Way Valve:** The reset can only be used to improve wages for United Technicians and will not be used to reduce United Technicians wages under any circumstances.

4

66. Akins stated the Cost Model was negotiated at the bargaining table as part of LOA #29 and would be put in a different excel format for ease of use to perform the mathematical formulations and computations. Akins emphasized the Adjustment Calculation was set, it was “not something that’s under a dark sheet or something that is made up.” Akins also confirmed, when asked, the 5-elements depicted will be the same 5-elements used in the future, and “they are known, they are not vague, that is what we fought for, real numbers you guys can look at.” The Akins presentation provided a draft Cost Model for each of the elements making up the Adjustment Calculation, including the American / Delta comparisons. The slide below depicts the written summary of the elements of the Adjustment Calculation. Exhibit 4, slide #6.

#### Model Comparative Elements

### Contract Elements Included in the Reset Analysis

#### 1) Pay

- Technicians All-in Wages (Basic pay, A&P License Premium, Line and Longevity)
- VEBA

#### 2) Time Off

- Annual Vacation, Sick and Holiday Hours

#### 3) Benefits

- Medical Cost Share
- Retirement Contribution

#### 4) Profit Sharing

- Profit sharing % to annual UA pre-tax profits

#### 5) Scope


- Based on ratio of Technicians heads per mainline aircraft

Note: Model analyzes Pay and Time Off element values at 10, 20 and 30 years of service, weighted 20%, 40%, 20% respectively for headcount. Gaps in all elements besides pay converted to dollars per hour based on UA All-in rate for computability in comparisons. <sup>6</sup>

67. Another slide, found on the next page, grouped the summary values for all of the “Non-Pay Items,” i.e., everything other than wages. This slide was also described as “baseline” for these items for the now CBA for the Adjustment Calculation. The sum value of the “Non-Pay Items” when added correctly is actually \$1.01 not \$1.02 as depicted on the slide. Nevertheless, Akins explained this was the baseline value for the CBA. Exhibit 4, slide #8.

## Current Model Example of Non-Pay Items

### Current Value of United TA vs. AA and DL Technician's Contract Element Average Costs Excluding Pay



Note: Model analyzes Time Off (Vacation, Sick and Holiday) values at 10, 20 and 30 years of service, weighted 20%, 40%, 20% respectively for headcount. Gaps in all elements besides pay converted to dollars per hour based on UA All-in rate in comparisons.

68. Akins specifically went over each element and each slide. Of note was the explanation of the Retirement element later expanded upon in 20-minute video.

69. Akins was clear the Retirement element was the value of what the pension payments to the Technicians would be. Bargaining notes also evidence “contributions” are direct reference to the defined contribution plans, a benefit which all three carriers provide to their technicians. With regard to how the defined benefit plan factored in, negotiation notes, the slides, and subsequently provided explanatory videos, show the retirement valuation for United Technicians at the baseline calculation, at the start of the CBA term, is allegedly 4.2% of annual pay as the defined contribution percentage was 3% at this time and the totally value depicted in 7.2%. Exhibit 4, slide #14.

70. The amount United is required to contribute to properly fund the defined benefit plan does not change the value of the plan to a Technician. Akins stated the only way there is an increase in any element for any carrier under this Adjustment Calculation, by this “reset,” is by changes in the CBAs or contracts of the measuring parties, i.e., United, American, and/or Delta.

71. There is no provision in LOA #29 to alter, redefine, or recharacterize these elements of the Adjustment Calculation. Any variance occurs by an update to CBA terms by any of the three airlines, e.g., enactment of a new CBA with differing terms from the baselines measurement or



1 awarded wage increases, in between measuring periods. Since the baseline measurement, United  
2 has not amended, modified, or otherwise changed in any way its retirement obligations to the  
3 Technicians. This is evidenced by the CBA provided to Plaintiff Scholz in March 2023.

4 72. In addition to Akins' detailed explanations and writings, as Akins himself stated,  
5 the information needed to do the Adjustment Calculation, to provide the data inputs, is all publicly  
6 available. One credible source for this information, beyond the actual CBAs of all three airlines  
7 and their required filings with federal and state governments, is the MIT Airline Data Project.

8 73. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), for over twenty years, curated  
9 this precise information as part of an Airline Data Project. The Airline Data Project, according to  
10 MIT's website, is "designed to support the goals of the MIT Airline Industry Consortium," which  
11 is a relatively small group of air carrier companies and adjacent organizations. United, American,  
12 and Delta Airlines are all members of this Consortium. One benefit of this membership is access to  
13 the research findings of the Airline Data Project. The project was put on hold during the pandemic,  
14 and is currently not updating; however, the data, its origins, and details of the project and the  
15 Consortium can still be viewed at <http://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/default.html>.

16 **3. Non-CBA Relevant Agreements and Provisions.**

17 74. LOA #29 states "Cost Model is an economic model, based in MS Excel, which  
18 calculates Annual Employee Cost. The model is to be agreed upon by economic experts from the  
19 company and the union within two months after the date of ratification of UA's agreement as  
20 Exhibit 'A.' If an agreement is not reached within this timeframe, the matter may be submitted for  
21 expedited arbitration as provided in Article 1 G." Exhibit 3, art. 1.G.

22 75. Logically, the sum of all wages and benefits paid to United's workers by United is  
23 a cost to United. Therefore, the summation of such compensation can also be understood to be the  
24 Annual Employee Cost. Stated another way, the Adjustment Calculation determines the biennial  
25 raise and the Cost Model depicts the data used to arrive at the assigned values to do the Adjustment  
26 Calculation. All of this information was provided at the "roadshow" ratification meeting.

27 76. LOA #29, Paragraph 2, a clause set apart from the Adjustment Calculation itself,  
28 also references the Cost Model. "The parties shall meet to review the Cost Model for the purposes

1 of reaching an understanding of the adjustment analysis. In the event the parties are unable to reach  
2 an understanding relative to the adjustment analysis, the matter may be submitted for expedited  
3 arbitration as provided in Article 1 G.” Exhibit 3, LOA #29, para 2. Again, this “understanding  
4 would be having checked each other’s math regarding the 5-elements of the Adjustment  
5 Calculation,” according to Akins. It should be pointed out that arbitrators under the RLA only have  
6 jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the CBA.

7 77. Since the filing of the original complaint, the Union Defendants have stated in court  
8 filings, and represented in court proceedings, that the Cost Model was negotiated between the  
9 Teamsters and United shortly after ratification as required by LOA #29. This Court has deemed  
10 this agreement, however, to not be part of the CBA, or incorporated into the CBA by reference.  
11 Accordingly, the Cost Model is an independent agreement not subject to RLA preemption.

12 78. All Defendants, as well Bob Fisher of the Teamsters and Javier Lectora of Local  
13 856, have made statements to the membership and to this Court that sometime after the CBA was  
14 ratified, United required non-disclosure agreements (“NDA”) United controlled to be entered into  
15 with, on information and belief, Dan Akins. Mr. Fisher and Mr. Lectora have stated as much to  
16 Plaintiffs; Fisher repeated this to Technicians affiliated with Teamsters Local 210. On information  
17 and belief, this NDA has allegedly recharacterized and redefined the terms of LOA #29.

18 79. In addition to being prohibited by the RLA, any such material change bearing on the  
19 CBA, and on Plaintiffs’ and the Class’ wages would require a ratification vote of the membership,  
20 according to the Union Defendants’ governing documents. No such vote has occurred.

21 80. Wages are subject to mandatory bargaining and any change to wages can only be  
22 effectuated through bargaining between the exclusive bargain representative(s) and the employer.  
23 Under the RLA, this must be preceded by notification of an intent to so bargain. 45 U.S.C. §156.  
24 Any changes to the CBA made outside of RLA § 156 negotiations is a civil, and criminal, violation.  
25 Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969).

26 81. Therefore, any material impact or change to the wage rules the plaintiffs were  
27 subjected to would be required to be bargained for, and put to a ratification vote per the RLA, and  
28 the Union Defendants’ governing documents, the Teamsters’ constitution and Local 986’s bylaws.

1           82.     Since ratification, the Technicians have agreed to, and ratified, one change related  
2 to LOA #29. In January of 2023, the Technicians agreed to, and ratified, an extension of the CBA.  
3 As is relevant here, in exchange for \$5.74 of wage increases, the technicians extended the CBA for  
4 one-year, surrendered the 2023 Adjustment Calculation, and permitted additional outsourcing.

5           83.     The only complete Cost Model ever provided to the Class, including Plaintiffs, was  
6 the draft Baseline Cost Model provided on October 18, 2016.

7           84.     On information and belief, United has entered into at least two agreements that are  
8 not part of the CBA – the Cost Model referred to in LOA #29 and the NDA, both with Dan Akins.

9           85.     This Court has held the Cost Model is not part of CBA nor incorporated by reference  
10 into the CBA. Thus, the duty to perform the promise of the Cost Model, to effectuate the duty to  
11 perform the Cost Model in order to determine proper wage adjustment for Plaintiffs and the Class,  
12 arises from state law. As a result, any rights Plaintiffs and the Class might have with respect to the  
13 proper performance of these exchanged promises is not preempted by the RLA. The standard is  
14 that of common law contracts as to whether the parties who undertook to perform the calculations  
15 did so in good faith, adhered to their duties to act honestly, and if they acted fraudulently or not.

16           86.     Unions have a fiduciary duty to deal fairly with their members and that fiduciary  
17 duty includes a general duty to respond to an employee member’s request for information regarding  
18 employment issues. By refusing to provide the information, the Unions directly impaired the  
19 employee-member’s rights under the collective bargaining agreement. *See* Office of the General  
20 Counsel, division of Operations-Management, Memorandum ICG 18-09, dated September 14,  
21 2018, and 19-01, dated October 24, 2018, entitled “General Counsel Instructions Regarding Section  
22 8(b)(1)(A) Duty of Fair Representation Charges” (stating the General Counsel’s position that a  
23 union’s failure to “respond to inquiries for information or documents by the charging party ...  
24 constitutes more than mere negligence and, instead, rises to level of arbitrary conduct unless a  
25 reasonable excuse or meaningful explanation”).

26           87.     Since at least October 18, 2016, Dan Akins, an actuary, has been retained by the  
27 Unions, in part, for purposes of handling the Adjustment Calculation and implementing the Cost  
28 Model, including reporting it out to the Unions. Akins therefore acts as an agent of the Union

1 Defendants, on their behalf. Akins has admittedly served in this role since at least 2013 acting on  
2 the Unions' behalf and for the benefit of Plaintiffs and the Class.

3 **4. LOA#29 Measurements Performed.**

4 88. The biennial Adjustment Calculations were allegedly all performed according to the  
5 measuring period schedule provided for in LOA#29, with results generally reported in November  
6 of each measuring period.

7 **a. First Measurement - 2018 LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation.**

8 89. At the first measuring period, there had been no changes to the CBAs of United or  
9 American. American remained in negotiations for its amalgamated contract following its merger  
10 with USAirways. The only discernible changes were actual profit-sharing monies of the three  
11 carriers and contractual wage scale increases. Delta had wage and profit-sharing increases.

12 90. United, and the Unions, reported out the Adjustment Calculation result via email to  
13 the Technicians. United announced due to dramatic increases in the "Non-Pay Items," there would  
14 be no raise or "reset." Despite not a single change to any United CBA provision for the agreed upon  
15 "Non-Pay Items," and increases for both American and Delta in those elements, e.g., profit-sharing  
16 far superior to United, the "Non-Pay Items" net values provided in 2016 had increased in value in  
17 United's favor, from \$1.01 to \$3.67. Below is the partial Cost Model provided by the Unions,  
18 demonstrating that the Adjustment Calculation would produce no raise.

19

	<b>United</b>	<b>Average of AA / D</b>
<b>Wages</b>	\$49.45	\$49.31
<b>Non-Pay Items</b>	+ \$3.67	
<b>Total Value</b>	\$53.12	\$49.31
<b>United (+ / -)</b>	107.7%	

20  
21  
22  
23  
24

25 91. A rudimentary calculation, however, applying the Akins explanations and methods,  
26 and assuming no change to the four unchanged "Non-Pay-Items" – Time Off, Medical Cost Share,  
27 Retirement, and Scope – given there had been no change to any CBAs or work rules but adjusting  
28

1 for Profit-Sharing which had seen a change, yielded an almost exactly opposite result. In order for  
 2 United technicians to be paid 102% of the combined average of American and Delta technicians,  
 3 an adjustment to United technicians' hourly wages of approximately \$3.89 per hour would need to  
 4 be made. See the chart below.

	<b>United</b>	<b>Average of AA/DL</b>
<b>Wages (All-In According to Union Defendants)</b>	\$49.45	\$49.31
<b>Profit Sharing (Using Technician Wage Statements)</b>	\$ 1.44	\$ 3.22
<b>Benefits (Non-Pay Items) [Used Baseline Numbers + new P/S Net] [\$1.56 + \$0.11 + \$0.47 + (\$0.12) + (\$1.44 - \$3.22)]</b>	\$ 0.24	
<b>TOTAL WAGES + BENEFITS [\$49.45 + \$0.24]</b>	\$49.69	\$52.53
<b>ADJUSTMENT CALCULATIONS</b>		
<b>United All-In Wage Rate</b>		\$49.69
<b>AA/DL Avg. x 102% [\$52.53 X 1.02]</b>		\$53.58
<b>ADJUSTMENT CALCULATION RESULT (UNITED +/- )</b>		(\$3.89)
<b>NET ADJUSTMENT CALCULATION REPORTED</b>		\$0.00

19 92. The result is jarring. Admittedly, the calculation is estimated as the actual Cost  
 20 Model or any Adjustment Calculation values do not account for the actual Non-Pay Item values  
 21 allegedly used by United or the Unions in performing and reviewing the result. However, such  
 22 variances would not be in dollars but closer to cents. None of the CBAs or contracted benefits other  
 23 than Profit-Sharing had changed. This calculation does use publicly available profit-sharing reports,  
 24 with weighting and conversion to a per hour figure based on annual wages accounted for.

25 93. Many technicians across the system pressed for an explanation to substantiate the  
 26 values reported by United and the Unions. Neither the Unions nor United responded.

27 94. One SFO Technician, Jim Seitz, "checked the math" producing the chart above,  
 28 which clearly shows a reasonable discrepancy. Believing the reported calculation to be wrong, Seitz

1 showed his calculation to his Local 986 representative, and asked for an explanation as to which  
2 one was correct. Local 986 could not explain it and would not explain it. As a result, Seitz filed a  
3 grievance to enforce LOA #29 contractual language against United to challenge the result of the  
4 Adjustment Calculation provided by United. The grievance requested that all data used to do the  
5 computation be provided to “check the math” as well as any other relevant information, including  
6 the Cost Model mentioned in LOA#29, if such information was used in the Adjustment Calculation.  
7 Other technicians based at LAX, O’Hare, Denver, Newark, Dulles, and Houston also filed  
8 grievances seeking an explanation to determine if they had been properly paid.

9 95. Prior to 2018 Adjustment Calculation, Teamsters Airline Division Representative,  
10 and Local 210 Business Agent, Vinny Graziano, had advised the Technicians in a Teamsters posted  
11 letter that the Excel Cost Model would not be provided for the upcoming 2018 reset as previously  
12 promised. The reason provided was that the NMB had since ordered it kept secret on the NMB  
13 servers to protect the Cost Model’s highly sensitive nature. At the time of the statement, months  
14 prior to the calculation, no Technicians had a reason to question this or think this was not true.  
15 However, when the 2018 Adjustment Calculation was reported, Seitz asked for the Cost Model to  
16 be provided to him in order to “check the math.” The Unions refused his requests.

17 96. Seitz’ grievance was never answered by United. Local 986 simply withdrew the  
18 grievance, stating there was no violation because the Unions and United had met and reported the  
19 result. The Unions claimed this satisfied their duty under LOA #29 and their duty to the member  
20 Technicians, including Seitz. The Teamsters subsequently, without prior notification or consent,  
21 ordered all grievances filed across the system withdrawn on the grounds they were meritless.

22 97. Despite Seitz’ protests of the handling of his grievance, and requests to advance it  
23 according to his contractual and statutory rights, neither United or the Unions ever did answer Seitz’  
24 or advanced his grievance.

25 98. Under the Unions representation at United, since 2008, in a case where a grievant  
26 wanted to advance his or her grievance from the Second Step to the Third Step System Board of  
27 Adjustment, where the Union found it meritless and did not want to participate, Local 986 would  
28 notify United of the parties’ positions – grievant proceeding and Local 986 releasing as a no-fund

1 case. This would initiate the Third Step process, if done timely, relieving Local 986 of any  
2 responsibility whilst respecting the grievant's rights. This is still the stated practice albeit applied  
3 at the subjective whim of Local 986 as to whether to honor the grievant's wishes.

4 99. Despite making the timely requests to advance his grievance, Local 986 refused to  
5 advance his grievance, contrary to the CBA and Seitz' statutory rights to access and complete the  
6 congressionally mandated grievance process. Local 986 stated because Local 986 did not agree  
7 with Seitz' assessment of his grievance, they would not advance it. This again is contrary to the  
8 practice for all other grievants under the Unions representation at this time and the RLA.

9 100. Some contextual background perhaps illustrates why such a divergent and  
10 seemingly impermissible action was taken. At the time of this measuring period, December 2018,  
11 tensions were high between United and the Technicians and incredibly strained between the Unions  
12 and its United Technician members.

13 101. A few weeks prior to the 2018 Adjustment Calculation announcement, on October  
14 31, 2018, the Technician-members sued the Unions and the United Defendants for depriving pre-  
15 merger United ("subUA") technicians of 7-years of pension rights and for diluting 7-years of  
16 subUA technicians profit-sharing monies.

17 102. On information and belief, this lawsuit prompted United to change the agreed upon  
18 Adjustment Calculation formulation and to have the Teamsters assist United in doing so.

19 103. The supporting documentation of that lawsuit supported claims that the Teamsters  
20 ignored CBA language for its own financial benefit so that it could gain control of the pension  
21 required to be part of the post-merger CBA, as well as illicitly gave profit sharing monies to then  
22 pre-merger Continental ("subCO") technicians in order to sway sub-CO votes in favor of Teamster  
23 pension plan offers.

24 104. During the negotiations for the current CBA, and during the time of the pension and  
25 profit-sharing litigation, the Teamsters routinely called subUA technicians greedy, and not team  
26 players, for not wanting to share their profit-sharing monies with subCO technicians. The subCO  
27 technicians had voluntarily surrendered those rights in their previous CBA negotiations. SubUA  
28 technicians took the position that United had the power to give subCO profit sharing, and should

1 give subCO technicians profit sharing, but that United could not just dilute the monies destined for  
2 subUA technicians. SubUA technicians, particularly Scholz and Jim Seitz, routinely stood up to  
3 the Unions for purposely dividing and misleading subCO technicians on these issues.

4 105. On information and belief, out of concern for an adverse ruling in the lawsuit that  
5 would require it to make restitution for the years' long failure to include subUA technicians in  
6 CARP, United began increasing their CARP contribution payments.

7 106. On information and belief, in derogation of United's duties under the its Bankruptcy  
8 Exit Agreement with its subUA technicians due to United's merger with Continental, on December  
9 10, 2010, United and the Teamsters secretly agreed United could delay compliance with the  
10 Bankruptcy Exit Agreement in exchange for agreeing subUA technicians would be enrolled in a  
11 Teamsters controlled or administered pension plan rather than putting this issue to a vote as required  
12 by the Bankruptcy Exit Agreement. The Teamsters admitted as much in a 2017 legal memo it  
13 provided to Scholz in finding his grievance, filed pre-lawsuit, over these issues lacked any merit.

14 107. Surveys taken at the time of the subUA technicians revealed an almost unanimous  
15 preference (98% of subUA technicians surveyed) for a defined contribution plan albeit with better  
16 terms than a United sponsored defined benefit plan. The Teamsters ignored these surveys so as to  
17 ultimately control subUA technicians pension benefits. Instead, the Teamsters pushed for, and  
18 proposed, plan after plan to United of a Teamsters controlled multi-employer plan, a Teamsters  
19 controlled single employer plan, and a Teamsters controlled Adjustable Pension Plan.

20 108. These secret dealings prevented and delayed for over 7-years subUA technicians  
21 from being enrolled in any pension plan – defined benefit or a better-defined contribution plan.

22 109. In conjunction with this, in February 2011, a few short months after the secret deal  
23 to delay pension enrollment for the subUA technicians was agreed to, 4-months after the merger,  
24 the Teamsters turned a blind eye while United diluted subUA technician profit sharing pool monies,  
25 allowing United to include subCO technicians in the subUA technicians profit sharing pool monies.

26 110. At this time, subCO technicians had no right to participate in any profit-sharing at  
27 United pursuant to the terms of the profit plan and subCO technicians' CBA, which the Teamsters  
28 had negotiated on the subCO technicians' behalf, which was ratified in 2010, after the merger.



1           111. While the terms of the profit-sharing plan permitted United to add terms which  
2 would give an employee or employee group profit-sharing monies, United did not change the plan's  
3 terms to include employee groups with no contractual right to profit-sharing monies. Nor did United  
4 amend the plans terms to otherwise include the subCO technicians. Instead, United (which at this  
5 time was run by Continental) treated the subCO technicians as participants in the subUA profit  
6 sharing pool although the subCO technicians did not meet the plan's definition of participant. Thus,  
7 including the subCO technicians in profit-sharing plan distributions violated the plan's terms.

8           112. The Unions, and United, also refused to process the grievances filed on these highly  
9 significant discrepancies. Both refused to convene the higher stages of the grievance process under  
10 similar pretextual and intentionally misleading basis – only the Union can participate at the higher  
11 stages of the grievance process. United, for its part, stated they were at the mercy of the Unions and  
12 could not permit the technicians to participate in the higher stages of the grievance process without  
13 the Unions. United also falsely claimed the grievances in this matter had been properly withdrawn,  
14 leaving United without a controversy to resolve. This led to the lawsuit in this district.

15           113. Not only did the Unions sit back and do nothing to protect the subUA technicians'  
16 rights, but they sowed division and discord amongst the two technician groups. The Teamsters  
17 called the subUA technicians greedy, selfish, and rats for wanting the Teamsters to defend their  
18 rights. Seitz, in particular, was labeled a rat and run out of the union in a sham trial, one in which  
19 he was neither present nor represented, on the grounds that he was disloyal and his actions were  
20 not in the best interests of the Unions. As its basis for doing so, the Unions cited to the Teamsters'  
21 constitution and Local 986 bylaws, including the oath taken by all members.

22           114. The Teamsters also spread legally and factually false "updates," insinuating that the  
23 subUA technicians were trying to steal subCO technicians profit sharing monies, adding that if the  
24 subUA technicians were successful, subCO technicians would have to pay all of the past profit-  
25 sharing monies they had received back, with interest and penalties. Sadly, this propaganda worked.  
26 The division was sowed. The two technician groups were now at war with one another. Instead of  
27 unifying and supporting all of its members equally and properly, as required, the Teamsters  
28 arbitrarily discriminated against one group or the other repeatedly for their own financial gain.

1           115. Plaintiff Scholz was one of the named plaintiffs who sued the Union Defendants and  
2 United for these egregious breaches of trust just before the 2018 Adjustment Calculation was  
3 announced. Plaintiff Scholz, and many other technicians across the system, believe this lawsuit  
4 caused the Teamsters, and Local 986, to acquiesce to all kinds of changes to the work rules, to the  
5 CBA, at United's behest lest the full breadth and depth of the Unions betrayal of its membership  
6 be exposed by United, which would almost certainly exact a heavy financial penalty on the Unions,  
7 likely leading to the altering of the LOA #29 formula for United's financial benefit.

8           116. In preparing for that litigation, the pension and profit-sharing litigation, Scholz  
9 learned that in 2017, six-months and one day after the CBA was ratified, on June 6, 2017, the  
10 Teamsters received a \$1.5 million dollar payment from United. It is a violation under Section 102  
11 Fourth of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. 152 Fourth, for a covered carrier to provide financial assistance to  
12 the labor organization in any amount. Neither the Teamsters nor United have ever accounted for  
13 this payment as a valid payment for legitimate reasons.

14           117. Seitz subsequently filed a lawsuit over the handling of his grievance related to the  
15 2018 Adjustment Calculation in this district; however, the lawsuit was ultimately dismissed. The  
16 Unions had moved for dismissal of the lawsuit on the grounds the action was untimely, which the  
17 court granted. The court never had an opportunity to reach the substantive issues of the dispute.

18                           **b. Second Measurement – 2020 LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation.**

19           118. The second measurement did not fare any better than the first. American had ratified  
20 its CBA with its technicians in which significant improvements were obtained in all 5-elements of  
21 the Adjustment Calculation. Delta had provided substantial wage increases to its technicians and is  
22 posting record profits. However, these gains are somehow largely negated, at least with respect to  
23 the Adjustment Calculation as provided by United, whose CBA has not been modified, who have  
24 not provided substantial wage increases, and who had dramatically reduced its technicians profit-  
25 sharing percentage.

26           119. On November 11, 2020, United, and the Unions, announced a 7.6% wage increase  
27 or approximately \$2.94 on average for the technicians. There were no calculations provided, not  
28 even the partial Cost Model that was provided in 2018. United, and the Unions, summarily stated

1 the percentage and average dollar amount raise only. There were no numbers for American or Delta  
2 to establish whether the 7.6% increase did in fact put United's technicians at 2% above the  
3 combined average of American or Delta. At least that calculation was provided in 2018. Neither  
4 was the "Non-Pay Items" summary value provided. There was absolutely no basis whatsoever for  
5 a technician to know how, and if, they were being paid correctly or if the Adjustment Calculation  
6 was being done correctly.

7 120. An elementary calculation using the publicly available wage rates of American and  
8 Delta to determine the combined average wage rate plus 2% yielded an hourly rate of close to \$60  
9 dollars, or \$59.57, by most accounts. United's comparable wage rate at that time was \$52.14, which  
10 was \$7.43 dollars below that of the combined average of American and Delta plus the 2%.

11 121. There was nothing but a full-throated endorsement by the Unions that United had  
12 done the calculation and it was correct. One comment rang truer to the Technicians than the others,  
13 without irony, the Unions stated, "the Adjustment Calculation is working exactly as intended."

14 122. As they had before, Technicians across the system performed some form of the basic  
15 calculation from the publicly available information, all reaching results three sometimes four times  
16 higher than the purported \$2.94. Many of these Technicians filed grievances.

17 123. At SFO, Jim Seitz and Geoff Wik, were two Technicians who filed separate  
18 grievances. Once those grievances were lodged with Local 986, an announcement was made for no  
19 one else to file a grievance as these two grievances would cover everyone. Under the CBA, United  
20 "recognizes the right of the Union to file a group grievance when the issue is common and identical  
21 to those employees in the group." Exhibit 3, art. 19.E.7. The CBA however does not waive,  
22 expressly or otherwise, a grievant's right to proceed individually in such a case.

23 124. Nevertheless, these grievances were closed without any investigation, notification,  
24 or consent. This was not without controversy however as the Unions actually revived the grievances  
25 after they had formally closed them, only to close them again. The timing of this was notable.

26 125. On February 4, 2021, the same day Scholz and the other named plaintiffs in the  
27 pension and profit-sharing lawsuit had oral arguments on United and the Unions motions to dismiss  
28 that case, Local 986 business agent Mark DesAngles emailed Seitz and Wik stating the grievances

1 were now reopened. No explanation was provided nor did Local 986 cite to any contractual right  
2 under the grievance process to do this. Local 986, when asked, also refused to state who approved,  
3 or agreed to do this, on United's end. Neither question was ever answered by email or in the Second  
4 Step hearing that was convened on March 4, 2021 over the grievances.

5 126. Local 986 did nothing to assist, investigate, prepare, or otherwise support these  
6 grievances, including refusing to provide any Adjustment Calculation information or data, even if  
7 to dispel Seitz' calculations and valuations. Seitz presented calculations, supporting documentation  
8 to support each of his calculation's mathematical assumptions, computations, and conclusions all  
9 culled from the known, publicly available and easily accessible, documents and information  
10 necessary to perform the calculation. The only evidence submitted or discussed by Local 986 were  
11 the grievances that had been filed by Seitz and Wik. United did not produce any competing evidence  
12 or any calculation to substantiate its position.

13 127. Shortly thereafter the grievances were again closed without prior notification or  
14 consent to Seitz or Wik. Local 986, after the fact, sent a single sentence letter informing Seitz and  
15 Wik their grievances were withdrawn for a lack of merit and the decision was final this time. Again,  
16 Seitz insisted on advancing his grievance as he is entitled to do and again, Local 986 refused to do  
17 so. As a result, Seitz filed another lawsuit in this district for the conduct in handling the Adjustment  
18 Calculation and the grievance process.

19 128. After deciding to file a lawsuit, and in anticipation of trial, in April of 2021, Seitz  
20 and Wik hired an attorney to assist in investigating the matters before the court. Specifically, they  
21 hired an attorney to make Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests and review other  
22 financial reports, documents, including SEC filings for the three air carriers and IRS Form 5500s.

23 129. One FOIA request result was notable. Responding to a request for the Cost Model  
24 stored on its servers, the NMB responded by letter that there was nothing to produce as their search  
25 had yielded no results. A follow-up conversation between Seitz' attorney and NMB representative  
26 attorney, John Gross, was even more enlightening. Mr. Gross definitively stated, "we never had the  
27 Cost Model on a server and never would ... we do not have a server like that, we do not use servers  
28 like that."

1           130. This information was introduced as part of Seitz' lawsuit. It was at this time that the  
2 reason for not providing the Cost Model shifted. United and the Unions now claimed in their  
3 motions to dismiss that the real reason there was no information available as to how United was  
4 calculating Technician pay was because the Cost Model actually contained highly confidential and  
5 proprietary information of the kind so sensitive, that if it were to be revealed to anyone, even the  
6 bargaining representative of Seitz in carrying out their representational duties, United would be put  
7 at immediate and perilous competitive disadvantage. This explanation went entirely unchallenged  
8 and was fully endorsed by the Unions both in court and to their membership despite the clear  
9 bargaining history to the contrary, i.e., everything, every element, every value, is publicly available.  
10 As Dan Akins had repeatedly stated, "we fought very hard to keep this very simple and all based  
11 on five publicly available elements." The Unions have not and cannot reconcile these statements.  
12 This fabricated and unsubstantiated theory persists today.

13           131. Seitz' case was eventually dismissed by the court. The court concluded in relevant  
14 part Seitz had not stated a plausible enough claim for breach of the duty of fair representation as to  
15 the Unions, which effectively settled the claim in favor of United as without the breach of the duty  
16 of fair representation claim, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the breach of contract (CBA) claim  
17 against United. The court seemingly based its reasoning on its acceptance of the unsubstantiated  
18 and frivolous assertion that the Adjustment Calculation information, and the Cost Model, could not  
19 be disclosed because it contained confidential and proprietary information.

20                           **c. Third Measurement – 2022 LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation.**

21           132. On November 23, 2022, United and the Unions each reported the 2022 Adjustment  
22 Calculation via separate electronic postings. This is the basis for the present controversy.

23           133. United and the Unions both reported the Adjustment Calculation yielded a 2.6%  
24 wage increase or an approximate average raise of \$1.20 per hour increase to the Basic Rate.

25           134. In an undated letter from United to the Teamsters' Vinny Graziano, United discusses  
26 conducting the 2020 Adjustment Calculation in November 2020. The letter acknowledges the Cost  
27 Model is the Adjustment Calculation results, which the actuaries then review and confirm. The  
28 letter refers to the Cost Model "analysis results" as being the results of the Adjustment Calculation.

1           135.   The 2022 result, even on its face, was wildly out of sync with the very public, and  
2 known, wage and benefit gains by American and Delta. It did not seem even facially plausible.  
3 Neither the Unions, nor United, stated the result was anything other than the true, objective result.

4           136.   As had been the case with all of the other Adjustment Calculations, Technicians  
5 from across the system approached both United and the Unions, including other affiliated local  
6 unions, regarding the result asking for documentation or to show the math in order to confirm the  
7 amount that was reported was correct. All were rebuffed and no supporting information was given.

8           137.   Notably, this time around, lower-level United officials, supervisors and managers,  
9 first response was there was no violation of the CBA as the Adjustment Calculation was done. Not  
10 that the calculation was correct or even that it was entirely confidential. They basically stated they  
11 knew people were mad but it was done, and “above their pay grade,” so nothing could be done  
12 about it. Even they had been told not to ask about the result process or conclusions.

13           138.   The Union Defendants, including other affiliated local unions, parroted the same  
14 response, i.e., no violation as United was not obligated to provide any information related to this  
15 result or to answer any questions as to how the result was reached. In California, under the Labor  
16 Code, an employee has a right to be able to calculate that they were properly paid and that should  
17 be readily discernible from the face of the provided wage statement. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.

18           139.   Some technicians, including Plaintiffs, “checked the math” in an attempt to verify  
19 the reported result. Unsurprisingly, the results were wildly divergent from the results provided by  
20 United, and allegedly reviewed and confirmed by the Union Defendants. Notably, all of the Class  
21 Technicians’ results were within cents of one another; none were dollars apart. The same cannot be  
22 said in comparison to the reported results of United and the Unions.

23           140.   Thereafter, grievances were filed throughout the system by members of the Class,  
24 including by Plaintiffs, complaining of these severe computational anomalies. The exact number  
25 of grievances cannot presently be ascertained because, as detailed above, the Unions have wrested  
26 all information related to the grievance process throughout the system away from the Technicians  
27 and have squirreled it away onto an electronic only certain union officials can access. Not one union  
28 representative provided any kind of computational explanation, not even a rudimentary calculation,

1 as to how the result was arrived at, conducted, reviewed, or confirmed when presented with these  
2 grievances and inquiries.

3 141. The grievances commonly charged United with having violated the LOA #29 and  
4 various provisions of the CBA. Each sought a basis for this result, and any lost compensation, as a  
5 remedy. Specifically, the grievances typically asked United to provide relevant documentation  
6 necessary to intelligently and rationally evaluate the result provided given certain mathematical  
7 variances. United did not provide any grievant or Class Technician with this information.

8 142. The Unions refused to do anything, claiming United had tied their hands and they  
9 could therefore not disclose any information. The Technicians reminded the Unions that not only  
10 did the Unions have a right to information under the RLA, but also the parties had bargained for,  
11 agreed to, and the CBA expressly authorized, the Union to make requests for relevant information  
12 related to grievances, to which United was required to respond, particularly where United was  
13 relying on such information to support, or defend, its position. Exhibit 3, art. 19.E.3.

14 143. The Unions' response was such requests were futile because United would refuse to  
15 respond. The Unions made no attempt to request the information or to make United comply to a  
16 request. As a result, many Technicians now firmly believe the Unions have entirely abandoned  
17 their representation of United technicians.

18 144. It is well-settled labor law that an employer is obligated to provide information that  
19 is needed by a bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties. NLRB v. Truitt  
20 Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Likewise, the duty to bargain unquestionably extends beyond the  
21 period of contract negotiations and applies to labor-management relations during the term of an  
22 agreement. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967). Such bargaining also includes  
23 rights to information to assess offers or the other party's position. Id.

24 145. United's response as to why it would not provide any information, including CBA  
25 integrated documents, was "the information was confidential and proprietary, and so to provide the  
26 information would put United at a competitive disadvantage." This explanation is implausible. The  
27 same information would be needed from American and Delta to correctly perform the calculation  
28 as written and agreed upon. How could this information be confidential only to United?

1 **B. Factual Allegations Specific to the Plaintiffs.**

2 146. Two SFO Technicians, Plaintiff Mullins and Plaintiff Scholz, grieved the 2022  
3 Adjustment Calculation. Conspicuously, Jim Seitz has not grieved this calculation. Seitz is no  
4 longer a technician at United as he was terminated by United during the pandemic.

5 **1. Plaintiff Mullins Grieves the 2022 Adjustment Calculation.**

6 147. Mullins was present for many of the informational meetings held by both United,  
7 and the Unions, where terms and conditions of the CBA, including LOA #29, were explained.  
8 Mullins has first-hand knowledge of the October 18, 2016 “roadshow” meeting where the Unions,  
9 specifically Akins, explained in great detail the working of LOA #29, its elements, functions, and  
10 application of the LOA#29 Adjustment Calculation. Mullins also has first-hand knowledge that the  
11 Cost Model was negotiated at the bargaining table, finalized at the bargaining table, albeit not in  
12 MS Excel format, and would be provided to the Technicians after each Adjustment Calculation.

13 148. Mullins recalls Bob Fisher, Edward Gleason, Dan Atkins, Peter Hardcastle, Vinnie  
14 Graziano, Chris Griswold, Clacy Griswold, Joe Prisco, Mark DesAngles, Javier Lectora, and John  
15 Laurin as being present to explain the CBA, and LOA #29. All emphasized the process was derived  
16 from easily obtainable public information and was designed to keep United technicians paid at least  
17 2% more than their counterparts at the other two legacy airlines, American and Delta.

18 149. The Unions routinely stated Technicians were trading profit sharing pool money  
19 share, and negotiating over wage increases, for the duration of the CBA for a set formula tied to  
20 easily identifiable and available information to calculate wage raises on a biennial basis. Bob  
21 Fisher, from the Teamsters Airline Division, specifically explained the idea was to not have the  
22 historical drawn out and hostile negotiations with United when the CBA became amendable. He  
23 explained this would also result in the Technicians not having to worry about retro pay because  
24 when the CBA became amendable, LOA #29 provided for an annual Adjustment Calculation,  
25 instead of biennial, until such time as a new CBA was entered into.

26 150. All Union officials, including the outside economists and actuaries hired by the  
27 Teamsters, all emphasized the parties would be able to “check each other’s math,” as such a process  
28 was expressly provided for in LOA #29. Mullins is aware of at least two recordings of these



1 meetings – one is a voice recording and one is video that was posted online. The Teamsters and  
2 Local 986 also made videos for the Technicians that they provided every Technician with the CBA  
3 voting materials pre-ratification, on portable USB drives. In the videos, Dan Atkins and Peter  
4 Hardcastle, the two outside economists who valued the CBA on the Technicians behalf, explain  
5 LOA #29, the Adjustment Calculation, and the resultant Cost Model again.

6 151. The stated goal expressed by both the Unions and United was for Mullins and the  
7 other United Technicians to always be paid more than United’s two main competitor technicians,  
8 those technicians at American and Delta.

9 152. Specifically, the stated goal was for United Technicians to be paid at least 2% more  
10 than the competitor technicians combined average of wages and benefits.

11 153. This would be tested every two years during the CBA duration, or at three separate  
12 measuring intervals. When the CBA became amendable after 2022, the measurement, and any  
13 resultant raise, would be performed annually so as to provide for more efficient and fruitful  
14 negotiations with United with such a big issue largely resolved, or so the theory went.

15 154. United’s announcement, sent though intra company email for the 2022 Adjustment  
16 Calculation claimed the calculation produced a 2.6% increase. For Mullins this was approximately  
17 \$1.23. Mullins did not see this email announcement until December 5, 2023.

18 155. Mullins immediately suspected something was off because in the past two years he  
19 knew there were many increases at American and Delta for all of the five categories for the  
20 calculation – wages went up, profit sharing was big, and significantly better benefits had been  
21 secured – yet, the United CBA was the same as it was not thus far amendable.

22 155. This was the basis for Mullins suspicion and thus, Mullins “checked the math,” i.e.,  
23 he performed the calculation himself using public information such as LOA #29, the CBAs from  
24 American and United, Delta’s Tech-Ops info and public press releases, all three airlines SEC  
25 documents and announcements, government websites, and the internet, to the best of his ability to  
26 at least get an idea if the numbers were right.

27 156. Below is a mockup of the kind of calculation he did and his results.  
28

	<b>UNITED</b>	<b>AA</b>	<b>DELTA</b>	<b>AA/DL Avg.</b>
<b>WAGES</b>				
Basic Rate	\$44.89	\$51.18	\$48.59	\$49.89
License	\$ 5.25	\$ 5.25	\$ 8.00	\$ 6.63
Line	\$ 1.00	\$ 1.00	\$ 3.00	\$ 2.00
Longevity	\$ 1.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00
VEBA	\$ 1.20	\$ 0.73	\$ 0.69	\$ 0.71
Profit-Sharing	\$ 0.40	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.60	\$ 0.30
<b>TOTAL WAGES</b>	<b>\$53.74</b>	<b>\$58.16</b>	<b>\$60.88</b>	<b>\$59.53</b>
<b>BEENFITS (NET)</b>	<b>(\$ 0.44)</b>			
<b>ADJUSTMENT CALCULATIONS</b>				
<b>United Wages + Benefits Rate</b>				\$53.34
<b>AA/DL Avg. x 102% = \$59.53 X 1.02</b>				\$60.72
<b>Net Adjustment Calculation</b>				<b>(\$7.38)</b>
<b>United Reported Adjustment Calculation</b>				\$1.23
<b>Missing Wages</b>				<b>\$6.15</b>

157. Mullins calculation came out to approximately \$7.18. Because it was so different, he went to United to confirm he had calculated correctly. Mullins also contacted his Local 986 union representative, Dale Mitchell, and asked for an explanation. Mitchell did not have one and said he would look into it. He was irritated that Mullins was asking for proof that the increase was only \$1.23.

158. Mitchell eventually agreed to file Mullins' grievance which Mullins had first written out by hand. Mitchell, a Local 986 Chief Steward, transferred the hand written grievance to, and entered it into, the electronic grievance system that only Local 986 officials can access. As stated above, rank and file members can no longer access, or see, any grievances, grievance process, such as initiating a grievance, or even they are in the process due to Unions' removal of all grievance information and access to the grievance system by placing it on a controlled computer system.

1 159. United’ answered Mullins’ grievance in writing on January 4, 2023:

2 “LOA 29 of the UA/IBT CBA provides, among other things, that economic experts  
3 from the Company and the Union agree on a costing model to calculate the industry  
4 reset. The parties agreed on the model within the parameters set out in the LOA, and  
5 utilized the model for the 2018, 2020 and the 2022 industry reset calculations. Much  
6 of the data that the model utilizes is publicly available ... like the [American]. Some  
7 of the information is Company confidential and proprietary, and can’t be shared  
8 publicly. And finally, the exact nature of the model and its operation is kept secure  
9 because it could put [United]at a competitive disadvantage if our competitors were  
10 to have access to it. It is for these reasons that the parties have agreed to maintain  
11 the confidentiality of the model.”

12 160. This response by United did not correspond with what Mullins was told at the  
13 informational meetings or with what he could read and calculate himself from the CBA or LOA  
14 #29 and therefore, on January 5, 2023, Mullins told Mitchell to appeal the decision. Mullins also  
15 told Mitchell he wanted to be present for the Second Step hearing, as is his right under the CBA  
16 grievance processes. See Exhibit 3, art. 19.

17 161. Mitchell gave Mullins a copy of that appeal document after the union filed it;  
18 however, Mitchell had signed Mullins name to it. Mullins had intentionally left the signature line  
19 blank. Local 986 has changed the significance of signing a grievance. Previously, by signing a  
20 grievance, the grievant’s signature acknowledged the grievant had filed the grievance and wanted  
21 it to be processed. But now, Local 986 had added a sentence above the signature line, without telling  
22 anyone and in 6-point font, stating in effect that by signing the grievance, the grievant agrees to  
23 waive their grievance rights and let Local 986 decide the grievance in any manner Local 986  
24 “deems proper.” Mullins had intentionally not signed the grievance because he did not want to  
25 waive his grievance rights or authorize the Union to take over and decide his grievance in any  
26 manner “deemed proper.”

27 162. For these reasons, Mullins immediately told Mitchell to remove his signature.  
28 Mitchell told Mullins that he had signed Mullins grievance because he saw no signature on it.  
Mullins reiterated his position and told Mitchell to remove his signature. On January 8, 2023,  
Mitchell told Mullins that he had removed Mullins signature from the grievance.

163. Mullins reached out to Mitchell several times to check the status of his grievance,  
any investigation, and to meet with Local 986 to discuss Mullins grievance, particularly, Mullins

1 calculations. Mullins specifically asked whether Local 986 had requested United provide relevant  
2 information as permitted, and agreed to, in Article 19.E.3 of the CBA, for Mullins grievance, i.e.,  
3 the summary values used by United in the Adjustment Calculation. Mullins called Mitchell several  
4 times but Mitchell never met with Mullins to go over the grievance or discuss its particulars.

5 164. On January 16, 2023, Mitchell emailed Mullins during the day to say the Second  
6 Step hearing would be the next day. Mullins asked to reschedule the hearing given his work  
7 schedule (Mullins works overnight) but Mitchell refused. “I acknowledge your request but we are  
8 going forward tomorrow as scheduled.” The CBA states, in Article 19.E.2, a witness’ schedule  
9 should be accommodated and thus, a hearing of this nature can be rescheduled to accommodate a  
10 witness schedule. Local 986 refused to do so despite Mullins request. Exhibit 3, art. 19.E.2.

11 165. Mitchell told Mullins that Mullins’ presence would not matter because Local 986  
12 had consolidated Mullins’ grievance with a grievance filed by another Technician, John Scholz, the  
13 other named-Plaintiff in this lawsuit. Mitchell never let Mullins explain the calculation. Nor did  
14 Mitchell ever present any information on Mullins behalf at the hearing or try to access any  
15 information that would enable Local 986 to properly evaluate Mullins grievance, including not ever  
16 requesting any documents for Mullins from United.

17 166. Mullins grievance was denied at the Second Step by United, on or about January 26,  
18 2023, with the same answer verbatim as provided to Mullins at the First Step (¶159 above). Mullins  
19 is not certain of the exact date United sent the letter because United’s Jesse Jandura sent multiple  
20 incomplete emails regarding United’s Second Step answer, failing to attach the letter to the email.  
21 Scholz gave Mullins a copy of the Second Step answer on January 29, 2023.

22 167. Mullins immediately requested Mitchell appeal United’s answer to the Third Step.  
23 Mitchell said Scholz already had and Local 986 was considering it. Mullins did ask Mitchell what  
24 there was to consider since it was the exact same answer Mullins was given at the First Step, which  
25 Local 986 had already determined was unacceptable. Mitchell simply stated Local 986 was  
26 considering his grievance.

27 168. On February 6, 2023, Local 986 sent Mullins a closeout letter stating his grievance  
28 had no merit, the matters could not be appealed, and the matter was closed. This made no sense

1 because the Second Step United answer was the exact same answer Mullins received at the First  
2 Step, which again, Local 986 had found unacceptable and sufficient to grieve.

3 169. Mullins conferred with Scholz over how to proceed. They understood from their  
4 shop steward training and duties that the Third Step was initiated by Local 986 sending a request  
5 to United. As is detailed further below, Local 986 refused to do this. Out of options, Mullins hired  
6 present counsel to initiate this lawsuit.

7 **2. Plaintiff Scholz Grieves the 2022 Adjustment Calculation.**

8 170. Plaintiff Scholz also independently performed the calculation to confirm he was  
9 being paid correctly and according to the CBA and LOA #29.

10 171. During the time of the negotiations and ratification of the current CBA and LOA  
11 #29, from 2015-2017, Scholz was a shop steward with Local 986. As part of his duties, he attended  
12 meetings where the CBA and LOA#29 terms and application were discussed in great detail,  
13 including how to present these unique wage adjustments to the membership.

14 172. Scholz received some training in the basics of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) and  
15 its legal impact on collectively bargained employees such as himself whose employment was in  
16 part governed by the RLA. Scholz also received training in reading and presenting the CBA, as this  
17 is part of a shop steward’s duties.

18 173. Scholz was also given extensive training on the governing documents of the  
19 Teamsters, and Local 986, and the CBA grievance procedures. The Teamsters have a guide to  
20 grievance handling that explains in detail how to handle a grievance pursuant to the RLA. This  
21 guide states it is the standard practice to request documents from the company to investigate a  
22 grievance either to support or disprove it. The guide also provides it is the standard practice to go  
23 over the CBA, any other documents or evidence the grievant might have to support his or her the  
24 grievance, and to interview not only the grievant but any potential persons or witnesses who may  
25 have relevant information or evidence.

26 174. Local 986, and more broadly Teamsters SFO 856/986, had a recognized practice to  
27 allow for a grievant to proceed with their grievance without union support through all of the stages  
28 of the grievance process. Local 986, or Local 856, would alert United to proceed directly with the

1 grievant for the higher stages of the process, either Third Step System Board of Adjustment, or the  
2 Final Step Board of Arbitration. This is commonly referred to as a “no-fund case.” Since ratification  
3 of the current CBA, these practices have been erratic and unevenly applied to Local 986 members.

4 175. Scholz was present for many informational meetings held by both United, and Local  
5 986, where the terms and conditions of the current CBA were explained and discussed, including  
6 during the weekly shop steward meetings with then Chief Steward John Laurin.

7 176. Scholz also attended the October 18, 2016 “roadshow” at SFO, where the Unions  
8 and negotiating committee members held an informational meeting to explain and pitch the CBA  
9 to the membership to vote on. Scholz recalls LOA #29, and its components were discussed by Dan  
10 Akins in detail, including how the then wages of United technicians compared to the other two  
11 airlines (American and Delta), how the parties had determined the parameters for what is now the  
12 Adjustment Calculation, and how that calculation was to operate and be performed. In addition to  
13 Akins, Bob Fisher stated all necessary information to perform the calculation would come from  
14 public information so that the members could see how it was being determined. A first calculation  
15 was demonstrated and each step explained. There are videos that demonstrate this.

16 177. Scholz is aware of at least two airlines who use, or have used, this model format to  
17 do provide raises to their technicians – American Airlines and Alaska Airlines. At those airlines,  
18 United’s information is used as part of the calculation. Notably, the name of LOA #29 in the first  
19 Tentative Agreement draft was “AA Industry Reset” because it originated at American Airlines.  
20 Both of those airlines show the basic summary values and calculations to their employees.

21 178. Akins explained, and Scholz reasonably understood, of the five components – Pay,  
22 Time Off, Benefits, Profit Sharing, and Scope – not all would change between the measuring  
23 periods from the baseline calculation. For example, Time Off and Benefits, what Akins referred to  
24 as the Non-Pay Items, baseline values would remain constant unless the CBA was ratified to include  
25 changes to those components. This would be true for all three comparative airlines.

26 179. Similarly, any positive changes made by American and/or Delta to a component for  
27 their technicians, would result in any difference between United and the other carriers in that  
28 particular component being reduced. This was by design so the Technicians could all see what was

1 happening. Akins repeatedly affirmed this process was entirely based on identifiable information,  
2 easily accessible, often emphasizing it was not based on any subjective decision by United or the  
3 Unions. This formula was spelled out, set, and finalized, if the technicians ratified the tentative  
4 agreement. Scholz understood checking the calculation would be like checking his paycheck each  
5 week by using his hours worked and wage rate and then deducting taxes. The result may not be  
6 exactly same but it would be close enough to appreciate if a possible error had been made.

7 180. As detailed above, MIT gathered this same information needed for the calculation  
8 as part of an Airline Data Project, collecting information for at least 15-airlines including United,  
9 American, and Delta, for all of the components of the Adjustment Calculation.

10 181. Scholz has used the MIT Airline Data Project data against his own data to “check  
11 the math” for the previous two measurements. In addition to the CBAs and work rules for all three  
12 airlines, Scholz has used Security and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) financial filings and  
13 documents, and Department of Transportation (“DOT”) Form 41 filings, to do his calculations. All  
14 of the information needed is, and always has been, publicly available and can be gathered from  
15 public sources, including those mentioned above. Scholz is aware of these sources because the  
16 Teamsters, primarily Dan Akins, told Technicians that these sources were where the information  
17 was gathered from, and where to find them, prior to ratification of the CBA in October 2016. Yet,  
18 in 2022, the Unions now told Scholz, and all Technicians that this information is now confidential  
19 and proprietary.

20 182. Scholz did the calculation for the previous measurements and none were accurate.  
21 Scholz did not file any grievances, request any documentation, or in any way involve himself in  
22 the previous measurement discrepancies because he had heard other Technicians had filed done so  
23 and Local 986 told everyone to stop filing grievances over this. This includes making any requests  
24 for the Cost Model or any other Adjustment Calculation documentation. Scholz only confirmed  
25 what he feared was happening – the calculation was not accurate and the Technicians were being  
26 underpaid.

27 183. Scholz did “check the math” for the 2022 Adjustment Calculation. A mockup of the  
28 calculation done by Scholz is reflected in the chart below.

	<b>UNITED</b>	<b>AA</b>	<b>DELTA</b>	<b>AA/DL Avg.</b>
<b>WAGES</b>				
Basic Rate	\$44.89	\$51.18	\$48.59	\$49.89
License	\$ 5.25	\$ 5.25	\$ 8.00	\$ 6.63
Line	\$ 1.00	\$ 1.00	\$ 3.00	\$ 2.00
Longevity	\$ 1.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00
VEBA	\$ 1.20	\$ 0.73	\$ 0.69	\$ 0.71
Profit-Sharing	\$ 0.40	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.60	\$ 0.30
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$53.74</b>	<b>\$58.16</b>	<b>\$60.88</b>	<b>\$59.53</b>
<b>BENEFITS</b>				
Time Off	\$1.56			
Medical	\$0.11			
Retirement	(\$1.85)			
Scope	(\$0.12)			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>(\$0.30)</b>			
<b>ADJUSTMENT CALCULATIONS</b>				
<b>United All-In Wage Rate [\$53.74 + \$0.17]</b>				\$53.44
<b>AA/DL Avg. x 102% = \$59.53 X 1.02</b>				\$60.72
<b>Net Adjustment Calculation</b>				<b>(\$7.28)</b>
<b>United Reported Adjustment Calculation</b>				\$1.17
<b>Missing Wages</b>				<b>\$6.11</b>

184. On November 25, 2022, Scholz emailed Local 986 officials asking for the values for each component to compare to his result. Not the data, but the summary values plugged in for each the elements of the Adjustment Calculation formula. Scholz did not receive a response.

185. Scholz emailed Local 986 several more times without a response until on December 5, 2022, Local 986 Chief Steward Maurice McDonald responded. McDonald did not provide any values and was unwilling to do so. McDonald told Scholz “we” cannot have that information.

186. Scholz also tried to discuss the calculation with his immediate United supervisor, Mike Richardson, asking him to provide the information. Richardson similarly stated he did not have that information and could not provide it. Scholz appealed to Richardson by explaining the reason for requesting the information, i.e., the conflicting calculation result from the one offered by United; however, Richardson would not provide and explanation or any information.



1 187. On December 8, 2022, Scholz conferred with his Shop Steward, Selvin Cabrera  
2 Najera, who agreed a grievance should be filed. Scholz gave Najera a written grievance. This was  
3 the first, and only, grievance Scholz has ever filed related to any Adjustment Calculation.

4 188. On December 8, 2022, Richardson, answered the grievance, “I am not privileged to  
5 this information and/or the numbers.” Shortly thereafter, Najera entered the grievance into the  
6 electronic database for it to be further processed. The grievance would idle for weeks.

7 189. Between December 8, 2022 and December 19, 2022, Scholz asked repeatedly for  
8 assistance from Local 986 to support his grievance and to look into his calculation. The answer  
9 each time was the same – cannot see that information and have no right to it.

10 190. On December 19, 2022, Local 986 apprised Scholz of United’s answer to his  
11 grievance. The information was proprietary and secret and so it would not be provided. Local 986  
12 accepted that at face value and recommended closing the grievance for lack of sufficient merit.

13 191. Scholz declined to do so, instead requesting it be appealed to the Second Step of the  
14 grievance process. Scholz again pressed them to investigate his calculation, reminding them of their  
15 own prior statements about the availability of the information, and that the CBA provided United  
16 had to turn over relevant information for his grievance per the CBA Article 19.E.3. Local 986 took  
17 no action. Local 986 officials Maurice McDonald, John Johnson, and Dale Mitchell, all said it was  
18 United’s call. This is wrong, the union of course can enforce the CBA for Scholz at any time.

19 192. A Second Step hearing was scheduled and held on January 17, 2023. Prior to that  
20 hearing not a single person from Local 986 interviewed, coordinated with, provided assistance to,  
21 or requested any relevant documents on behalf of, Scholz despite dozens of requests of various  
22 Local 986 officials to do just that.

23 193. On January 11, 2023, Dale Mitchell told Scholz the United answer was going to be  
24 the same one United provided as the First Step answer for another grievance filed related to the  
25 Adjustment Calculation, the grievance filed by Tom Mullins. This “insight” indicated to Scholz  
26 that the hearing was simply a pretext.

27 194. Alarmed by Mitchell’s cavalier attitude to this most serious matter, Scholz told  
28 Mitchell he would not accept an answer already considered unsatisfactory on Mullin’s First Step

1 without a supported basis. Scholz also told Mitchell it was Local 986's job to represent him and not  
2 United and to help substantiate, or even disprove, Scholz' grievance. Mitchell did nothing.

3 195. Scholz asked for the hearing to be delayed until United responded as required to the  
4 requests made for relevant information but Local 986 refused to do that. Mitchell and McDonald  
5 both told Scholz "the hearing is the time and place to get the information from the company." That  
6 never happened either.

7 196. Jesse Jandura appeared for United. Scholz does not know if Jandura is a proper party  
8 under the grievance procedures to have overseen the Second Step hearing as at that time, Paul Joklic  
9 was the Managing Director of TechOps. Local 986 did not challenge this nor provide confirm to  
10 Scholz that Jesse Jandura was the proper party. Exhibit 3, art. 19.B.4.

11 197. Of note, at the hearing, Jandura refused to let Scholz play the Akins video Scholz  
12 was provided with as part of the ratification voting materials related to LOA#29. The video clearly  
13 supported Scholz' position and calculations, including that all of the information required to do the  
14 calculation is public not proprietary or confidential. Scholz had a laptop to play it, but Jandura  
15 refused to watch it. Jandura would not accept a copy of the video into the record either as evidence.  
16 Mitchell said "the union" would give Jandura one instead.

17 198. Scholz does not know if this ever occurred or if the video was viewed. Scholz was  
18 alarmed Local 986 did not challenge United's refusal to accept evidence of the reasonableness of  
19 the grievance. There is no basis for United to refuse to look at any supporting evidence and more  
20 importantly, Local 986 was aware of the authenticity and value of the video to Scholz' claims.

21 199. United's only evidence, presented by Cathy Abbott, was LOA#29 which she had  
22 copied from the CBA. After reading the entirety of LOA#29 into the record, Abbott concluded that  
23 United had done the Adjustment Calculation correctly. Abbot did not provide a single calculation,  
24 offer any explanation, or supporting materials justifying United's answer to the two grievances –  
25 that the information could not be provided because it was confidential and proprietary. Abbott also  
26 failed to review or challenge the calculation offered by Scholz.

27 200. Local 986 sat back and did nothing. Local 986 did not advocate for, or in any other  
28 way, attempt to support Plaintiffs' grievances. Local 986 simply read the grievances and the LOA

1 into the record. As Dale Mitchell had known, the grievances were denied on January 25, 2023 by  
2 Jesse Jandura with the exact same answer Mullins was given at the First Step of his grievance.

3 201. Following receipt of this letter, Scholz insisted on meeting with Local 986 in an  
4 effort to move the grievances to the Third Step. On January 27, 2023, and again on January 31,  
5 2023, Scholz implored Local 986 to meet with him and start the Third Step process. The answer  
6 however was always the same – United controls this process and what we can do, be patient. The  
7 CBA-time limitation to initiate the Third Step was February 8, 2023.

8 202. United correctly sent the Second Step answer on February 5, 2023, prompting Local  
9 986 to insist to Scholz this altered the deadline to initiate the Third Step, extending it to February  
10 15, 2023. When Scholz asked for proof of this, Local 986 said did not need it, this is how it is done.

11 203. On February 6, 2023, Scholz sent an email at approximately 7 a.m., again asking  
12 Local 986 to initiate the process to appeal to the Third Step SBA, expressing his concern that the  
13 deadline to do so was only 2-days away (February 8, 2023) per the CBA. Within thirty minutes, of  
14 this email, Chief Steward McDonald informed Scholz the grievances would be discussed later that  
15 morning.

16 204. Just shortly after 11:30 am, Scholz was informed by Mitchell that the grievance had  
17 been discussed and a decision reached by the Grievance Committee and thus, McDonald would be  
18 contacting Scholz shortly. McDonald sent Scholz an email two-hours later telling him “attached is  
19 a closeout letter.” Without any discussion with or prior notification, Local 986 withdrew and closed  
20 the grievances, sending a closeout letter to Scholz stating, “It was determined the grievances did  
21 not having sufficient merit to advance to the next step. Therefore, the grievance is closed out.” This  
22 is arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a grievance. See Gregg v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters Helpers  
23 Union Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015 (1983) (grievances considered and withdrawn on the same day  
24 were not carefully considered rendering the decision arbitrary). Grievances with such high value to  
25 the members, and accruing at a rate of \$2.4 million dollars a week, warranted barely a few hours  
26 of deliberation, no meaningful review of the calculations, and no substantiation of United’s  
27 proffered basis of proprietary and confidential, particularly when those words do not appear  
28 anywhere in LOA #29. Dan Akins, on behalf of the negotiating committee of which Local 986 was

1 a part, had repeatedly stated this would all be public, available, and accessible for Technicians to  
2 “check the math.” Scholz was hard pressed to find any rational basis for this consistent with a  
3 reasoned, equitable resolution supportive of the members.

4 205. As soon as he saw the email and closeout letter, Scholz emailed asking for an  
5 explanation because neither the email or the letter contained one. The more substantial a grievance,  
6 the more substantial of an answer a union must provide if settling a grievance without getting  
7 anything in return. Gregg Chauffeurs, 699 F.2d at 1016 (when a grievance is “important and  
8 meritorious,” a union must provide a “more substantial reason for abandoning it.”). Scholz asked  
9 who had made this decision and whether United had been notified that Local 986 had withdrawn  
10 the grievances. There is no process in the CBA to reopen a closed grievance. If Local 986 had  
11 closed the grievance, there would be nothing Scholz could do to force United to continue to  
12 participate in the grievance process. No one ever responded. On information and belief, Local 986  
13 sent an email to United that same day, withdrawing and terminating the grievances.

14 206. Scholz’ email also asked for the process to be released by Local 986 to continue the  
15 grievance process with United but without Local 986 as a no-fund case. No one ever responded.

16 207. On February 7, 2023, at 6:28 am, Scholz sent another email stating unequivocally  
17 that the email was to serve as his written request to appeal the grievance to the SBA as United’s  
18 answer is not supported by the facts, the express language of the CBA, or the law. Scholz sent this  
19 email to Jesse Jandura and Cathy Abbot on behalf of United and to Local 986 officials Fred Wood  
20 (Grievance Committee), Josh Johnson (Chair, Grievance Committee), Maurice McDonald (Chief  
21 Steward), and Mark DesAngles (Business Agent).

22 208. Only Mark DesAngles replied. He reiterated that the matter was closed, Scholz had  
23 received a close-out letter, and that the grievances had been thoroughly reviewed, where the “SFO  
24 Grievance Committee voted to close out your grievance for lack of merit.” DesAngles did not  
25 expand or explain as to why the grievances lacked merit. DesAngles claimed, “according to Article  
26 19.B.6 of the [CBA], “...if the decision is not satisfactory to the employee and his Union  
27 Representative, the Union may appeal such grievance to the System Board of Adjustment” and that  
28 Scholz did “not have the authority to unilaterally appeal a grievance to System Board of Adjustment

1 ... . Only the Union has the authority to appeal grievances past the 2nd Step. this (sic) email shall  
2 serve as notice to you that the Union considers the matter closed.”

3 209. By DesAngles’ own admission, the CBA states in part, “Union may appeal such  
4 grievance ... .” It does not say solely nor does it bar a grievant from doing so nor is there any other  
5 limiting language to suggest a grievant wanting to exercise their RLA-statutory rights cannot do  
6 so. As stated in the Teamsters’ and Local 986’s own grievance handling training materials, the RLA  
7 grants covered employees the right to pursue, and complete, the grievance process individually.

8 210. Scholz responded by sending DesAngles a recent case, Bumpus v. Air Line Pilots  
9 Assn. Int’l. & United Airlines, Inc., 2022 WL 2105872 (N.D. III June 10, 2022), explaining what  
10 he was taught by the Teamsters – he had a right to pursue his grievance. Scholz continued to implore  
11 Local 986 to respond to how to go about initiating the SBA without them and reiterating his  
12 rejection of closing the grievances without prior notification or consent, which had the effect of  
13 settling this grievance in United’s favor, emphatically stating he did not agree with United’s  
14 assertion, now disproven, that the information is confidential and proprietary answer. None of the  
15 recipients of those communications responded to Scholz’ actual questions.

16 211. Plaintiffs knew from their shop steward training and attendance at shop steward  
17 meetings, the standard protocol for advancing a grievance was to have Local 986 send a written  
18 request to United on behalf of the released grievant. Local 986 would not do this for these Plaintiffs.  
19 Scholz followed the normal protocols that he was trained in, and understood to be the proper process  
20 yet he was entirely unsuccessful.

21 212. At United, the SBA is not a separate entity nor does it have its own office, separate  
22 phone number, email address, or even any stated list as to who comprises it. At least none that  
23 Plaintiffs can access or know about. A Technician can only ask his or her union representative to  
24 initiate the process with United after which United and the union decide who will comprise the  
25 board, when and where it will be held, and the time despite the CBA-provisions stating otherwise.

26 213. Former Chief Steward John Laurin once told Scholz that the SBA is not really a  
27 thing, it is just the same four people who get together when they decide to and resolve grievances.  
28 Ed Kelly, Scholz’ now retired previous Shop Steward, was a witness to this conversation.

1 **C. Additional Factual Allegations Related to LOA #29 Grievances.**

2 214. Since the filing of the original complaint, Plaintiffs were informed of significant  
3 information related to this lawsuit, which Plaintiffs have independently verified.

4 **1. Local 856, part of TeamstersSFO 856/986, Informs Scholz of Falsity.**

5 215. On February 7, 2023, Local 856 Business Agent, Javier Lectora, approached Scholz  
6 shortly after the start of his shift, around 6 am. Several co-workers overheard and/or witnessed this  
7 conversation: Scott Hounsell, Mike Albertien, and John Johnson, Local 986 Grievance Committee

8 216. Lectora was agitated, nervous, and pacing. He repeatedly said he “was here as  
9 [Scholz]’ friend” but “this is in total confidence between me and you and if you say it happened, I  
10 will call you a liar.” Lectora told Scholz United did not have to provide the values because of prior  
11 grievances having been closed. Lectora told Scholz there was nothing he could do about it.

12 217. Lectora told Scholz “there are grievances filed in other stations” and that the “union  
13 did not agree with the company.” He also said “it is all about the pensions” and that “we do not use  
14 any accurate American or Delta information. We guess. The economist and United make it up.  
15 United Airlines does not get the numbers. United analyzes public information and does not want to  
16 give you any of the numbers because you will be able to reverse engineer and check it. It is not  
17 about you or the union.”

18 218. Lectora went on to say there is language to keep it secret in LOA #29 and “that it is  
19 in the legalese” and “once Jim’s [Seitz] lawsuit is finalized the union is going to use that decision  
20 to block this every time it comes up because as union reps we can just say we don’t have to do this  
21 and we will be ok.” The conversation was almost one hour. Scholz, while taken aback by what  
22 Lectora had told him, decided to file a lawsuit shortly after this conversation.

23 219. At all material times, Javier Lectora worked for Local 856 as a Business Agent.  
24 Local 856 is the other affiliated local union at SFO, which along with Local 986, jointly performs  
25 representational activities as TeamstersSFO 856/986 at SFO. Lectora’s general duties include  
26 enforcing and administering the CBA negotiated for Plaintiffs and the Class, and representing  
27 members working under that agreement. Inherent in these general duties is the authority to  
28 communicate and act on behalf of Local 856, and even Local 986. It, therefore, is reasonable for

1 members to believe Lectora was acting and speaking truthfully on their behalf when he engaged in  
2 the conduct at issue.

3 **2. Teamsters Statements at Local 210 Craft Meeting.**

4 220. On November 29, 2022, a noticed craft meeting of Local 210 was held in person  
5 and via videoconference (Zoom). Local 210 is another affiliated local union of the Teamsters. Local  
6 210 represents United technicians at Dulles Airport (“IAD”), John F. Kennedy Airport (“JFK”),  
7 and Newark Airport (“EWR”). The meeting was recorded.

8 221. Present in person in Newark were Teamsters’ Airline Division (“AD”) officials: Joe  
9 Ferreira (then Teamsters AD Director, since resigned), Bob Fisher (Teamsters AD Deputy Director,  
10 now Acting Director), Vinny Graziano (Local 210 EWR Business Agent and Teamsters AD  
11 Representative). Also present in Newark were Local 210 officials: Dave Mahood (Local 210 Dulles  
12 Chief Steward), Blake Silverstein (Local 210 Dulles Shop Steward), and Alan Cosides (EWR Local  
13 210 Chief Steward). There were approximately 15-technicians present at each of the 3-scheduled  
14 meeting times in person in Newark. Many others logged in to attend the meeting.

15 222. The 2022 Adjustment Calculation had recently been released. The meeting was  
16 highly contentious and the focus was on the announced Adjustment Calculation result. Those able  
17 to speak at the meeting almost entirely directed their questions to the recent calculation result. Many  
18 had, like the other Technicians across the system had done, estimated calculations and arrived at  
19 substantially disparate results from the one announced by United and the Unions.

20 223. As is relevant here, Ferreira, Fisher, and Graziano all made statements directly  
21 related to the calculation that: it “was about 12% or more,” “the actual result was \$5 dollars higher,”  
22 “by our calculations should have been almost \$6.”

23 224. As is relevant here, Ferreira, Fisher, and Graziano all made statements “that we  
24 know the reset is a disaster” “we know the scales are all messed up” “if you work at American and  
25 go through the scales you make \$150,000 dollars more than United Airlines and if you hire on at  
26 Delta Airlines, you are going to make \$175,000 dollars more going through the scale right.” All  
27 three men repeatedly stated, “we cannot provide you the breakdowns” “the information is United  
28 confidential” “we do not use the pay scales for the calculation” “we don’t have the numbers because

1 we did not sign the NDAs” “this has nothing to do with pay rates” and “the reset was just a buffer  
2 that did not turn out right but it has nothing to do with the pay scales.”

3 225. As is relevant here, those rank-and-file members present asked to see some kind of  
4 substantiation, some kind of proof that this was done according to the CBA, specifically the formula  
5 provided for in LOA#29. Many were outraged that the union would not support them, not stand up  
6 for them, in the face of the clear errors and the drastic reduction being forced upon them by United.  
7 Things were so tense there was talk of putting Graziano’s “head on a pike.” No union official  
8 offered any other explanation for such plainly observable discrepancies in the pay rates between  
9 the three carriers or the obviously errant Adjustment Calculation result.

10 226. As is relevant here, Teamsters officials Ferreira, Fisher, and Graziano expressly  
11 stated that they had been on a Zoom call on November 22, 2022, the day prior to the release of the  
12 2022 Adjustment Calculation results, with Dan Akins, all affiliated local business agents, and all  
13 affiliated local principal officers. The point of the meeting was for Dan Akins to provide and  
14 demonstrate the results of the 2022 Adjustment Calculation. Fisher stated Akins went through all  
15 the elements, showing those present the Cost Model. Akins exact words were “you are not going  
16 to like this but I have a s\*\*t sandwich to share with you.” The implication being United insisted on  
17 reducing the number and the Unions were going to go along with it.

18 227. At the November 29, 2023 meeting, Bob Fisher implicated himself and the others  
19 in the secret scheme and admitted to a number of false statements. Fisher told those present in  
20 Newark that Akins had shown them the Adjustment Calculation, the Cost Model, and explained in  
21 detail the results yet, for years, as will be further detailed below, Fisher has repeatedly represented  
22 to the membership that no information can be shared because only those who have signed United’s  
23 non-disclosure agreement can view any Adjustment Calculation or Cost Model material. This is  
24 false given all of the information shared with all business agents and principal officers on the  
25 November 22, 2022 Zoom call. Fisher statements acknowledge the day before the announcement  
26 of the Adjustment Calculation result, all knew the proffered result was false.

27 228. All Class members, including the Plaintiffs, received similar responses from the  
28 Teamsters and their local union officials ranging from “this is wrong but I cannot do anything about



1 this” to “this is completely f\*\*ked and we are getting screwed again.” Multiple grievances were  
 2 filed throughout the system and all were denied on similar grounds of the unions can do what they  
 3 want and you cannot do anything about it, your grievance is meritless. Requests to appeal these  
 4 decisions are systemically and routinely denied, regardless of significance of documentary support  
 5 or legitimate demonstrated errors, including denying requests to appeal the decisions through the  
 6 provided intraunion appeal process provided for in the Teamsters’ constitution. Exhibit 1, art. XIX,  
 7 sec.2(a).

8 229. An obligation to disclose information arising out of Section 2, First of the RLA is a  
 9 legally enforceable one. *See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union*, 402 U.S. 570, 577  
 10 (1971). The lack of any mandatory administrative body such as the NLRB permits a party with a  
 11 disclosure dispute under the RLA to proceed as Plaintiffs here have done directly to court.

12 **3. Teamsters’ Statements Regarding Local 781 (ORD) Grievances.**

13 230. The announcement for the 2022 Adjustment Calculation went out on November 23,  
 14 2022, the day after the Zoom call with Dan Akins. United posted its announcement on November  
 15 23, 2022, as well on its intranet, stating the calculation yielded a 2.6% raise. Those who did perform  
 16 similar, rudimentary checks of the calculation like Plaintiffs did, also arrived at results between  
 17 15% and 16%, like Plaintiffs, with an average of about \$7.35.

18 231. Plaintiffs were not the only two technicians to file grievances contrary to United’s  
 19 representations to this Court. To date, to Plaintiffs knowledge, grievances were filed at United’s  
 20 stations throughout the system over the Adjustment Calculation in: Denver (DEN), Los Angeles  
 21 (LAX), Houston (IAH), Newark (EWR), Dulles (IAD), and O’Hare (ORD). Most were never  
 22 processed beyond the First Step. Some received responses from United that were verbatim the  
 23 response Mullins received at the First Step. The only responses ever provided by the Teamsters, or  
 24 any local union, were: (1) the information was proprietary and could not be disclosed; or (2) the  
 25 grievances lacked sufficient merit. Neither response was ever expanded upon, supported by any  
 26 objective facts or reasons. Just single sentence answers. These answers are also false.

27 232. On information and belief, shortly after Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, the  
 28 Teamsters ordered all grievances related to the 2022 Adjustment Calculation across the system to

1 be withdrawn, terminated, and removed from the system. Chief Steward Mike Pecoraro of ORD  
2 informed ORD technician Sally Dill that the Teamsters had sent Angel Cantu from the national  
3 office to ORD to demand all copies of all grievances. Pecoraro refused to do provide them without  
4 written orders / authorization and a substantiated basis to do so. Pecoraro maintained the Teamsters  
5 had no authority to do this as all grievances are handled by the local unions not the Teamsters.  
6 Cantu left without the grievances having been destroyed.

7 233. Other affiliated local unions have reported to Plaintiffs previously filed grievances  
8 on the electronic grievance database are no longer there, not even as historical, closed grievances  
9 with corresponding paperwork. It appears the Teamsters attempted to purge all Adjustment  
10 Calculation grievances without any prior notification, consent, or authorization. Bob Fisher  
11 admitted in an email to ordering termination of ORD Dill's grievance and DEN Wik's grievance.

12 234. Repeated protests to undo these actions were ignored, rejected, and generally not  
13 acted upon at all. Some were told that the Teamsters are the only ones to decide what to do with  
14 grievances. This is in direct conflict with the Unions' governing documents. *See* Exhibit 1, 2.

15 235. The Teamsters also refused to provide information of how to exercise appeal rights  
16 that are found in the Teamsters' constitution. Bob Fisher expressly stated in an email on July 10,  
17 2023, to Dill that if the Teamsters decide a grievance has no merit that is the end of the process,  
18 that there is no appeal process. This is contrary to the express terms of the Teamsters' constitution  
19 and the local bylaws. Exhibit 1, art. VI, sec. 2, 3; art. XIV, sec. 3; art. XIX, sec. 4 and Exhibit 2,  
20 sec. 10(k); sec. 20(E); sec. 15; and sec. 21(6). Bob Fisher wrongfully claimed the Teamsters have  
21 the power to arbitrarily nullify the Teamsters' constitution. He did so to mislead a member. It is a  
22 foundational tenet of the Teamsters' that they can advise, encourage, or otherwise assist when asked  
23 to do so by an affiliated local union but the Teamsters can never step on the local union's rights.  
24 Local autonomy is allegedly sacred to the international union and is fiercely protected in order for  
25 the local unions to remain autonomous.

26 236. Fisher also asserted to Dill that because the membership ratified an extension to the  
27 CBA in January 2023, any issue of a discrepancy was "moot" and "that the new wage rates thereby  
28 render[ed] any calculation in accordance with LOA #29, moot." There is nothing in the CBA or the

1 ratified CBA-extension that nullifies or “moots a grievance.” These are separate and independent  
2 events.

3 237. The extension ratified by the Technicians, on or about January 30, 2023, made  
4 reciprocal promises for new consideration. The Technicians agreed to surrender the future 2023  
5 Adjustment Calculation, agreed to extend the CBA for one year, and permitted United additional  
6 outsourcing rights. And in exchange, United increased certain wages in an average amount of \$5.74  
7 on average per hour. This exchange of promises and consideration is separate from the 2022  
8 Adjustment Calculation. Moreover, there is nothing in this extension that states the wage increase  
9 nullifies the errors in the 2022 Adjustment Calculation or “moots” any grievance related to it. These  
10 are separate and independent events with separate consideration and promises.

11 238. It is notable that the consideration offered by United is almost exactly the amount  
12 of wages Plaintiffs and the Class allege United’s scheme with the Unions deprived them of.

13 **4. Union Statements Implicate Secret Agreements and False Disclosures.**

14 239. On November 22, 2022, Lectora, in his role as Local 856, attended the meeting with  
15 Dan Akins where the Adjustment Calculation result was reviewed and discussed in order to later  
16 inform the Class, which Lectora did, of the result, the investigation, and disclosure of information,  
17 including the refusal to pursue their grievances or challenge United’s false result. Lectora had  
18 personal knowledge on February 7, 2023 when he made the above detailed comments of the falsity  
19 of United’s representation of the Adjustment Calculation result and United’s assertion the  
20 information used in the Adjustment Calculation was proprietary and confidential

21 240. Bob Fisher, on November 29, 2022, in his comments at the Local 210 meeting to  
22 those present and those on Zoom, confirmed Local 986 Business Agent Mark DesAngles was also  
23 in attendance at the November 22, 2022 Dan Akins meeting where the true nature of the Adjustment  
24 Calculation was revealed, along with United’s demands that the result be falsified.

25 241. It is well-established and confirmed that as a Business Agent for Local 986, Mark  
26 DesAngles had the discretion to notify the principal officer of Local 986, Chris Griswold, or the  
27 Teamsters principal officer, Sean O’Brien, of the grievances based on the CBA, and of United’s  
28 defiance, in order to represent and protect the membership as a whole. It is also well-established

1 and confirmed that DesAngles was aware that the statements he made to Scholz in relation to the  
2 grievances were false as DesAngles had been informed and was aware the day before any union  
3 official made the first 2022 Adjustment Calculation announcement to the membership, on or about  
4 November 23, 2022, that the announcement reporting the Adjustment Calculation result would be,  
5 and was false.

6 242. Fisher's statements and actions, as well as those of Lectora and DesAngles made to  
7 and directed at Plaintiffs, are attributable to Union Defendants, regardless of whether they were  
8 explicitly authorized. *See Teamsters Local 641 (Air Products, Inc.)*, 91 NLRB 1381, 1392 (1950).

9 243. Plaintiffs' grievances are not limited to the acquisition of the Cost Model. Plaintiffs  
10 sought to challenge the calculation of their pay, and the now apparent illicit reduction of the actual  
11 agreed upon contractual wage rate, in order to prevent United from unilateral and arbitrarily  
12 reducing Plaintiffs and the Classes pay for United's financial windfall. This is wage theft. United  
13 has deprived Plaintiffs and the Class of tens of millions of dollars of earned, owed, and due wages  
14 by colluding with, and coercing, their union representation into adopting illegitimate contractual  
15 interpretations for United's benefit by secret fiat.

16 244. On February 18, 2023, Scholz requested the complete CBA from the Teamsters and  
17 from Local 986. He got a response from Local 986 but it was incomplete and did not include any  
18 additional letters of agreement, memorandums, appendices, exhibits, or the Cost Model. Scholz is  
19 aware of over a dozen side letters that may have been entered into by the Unions with United since  
20 ratification. At the hearing on the Defendants' motions to dismiss in this action, United's counsel  
21 stated United and the Unions have entered into dozens of agreements and side letters but do not  
22 make them public. There can be no secret wages, terms, or conditions of a CBA under the RLA.

23 245. Since the original filing of the complaint, United has now volunteered that the  
24 "confidential and proprietary information" is solely the amount of the funding contributions to the  
25 defined benefit plan, CARP, that are so sensitive that disclosure would put United at a competitive  
26 disadvantage. This is irrational. The IRS and the Department of Labor require this exact information  
27 to be not only publicly disclosed in mandatory reporting documents to the government but United  
28 is also required by law to provide such information to the Class as participants in the pension plan.

1           246. As detailed above, the United Defendants and the Union Defendants specific  
2 handling of ERISA guarded pension and profit-sharing rights is at the core of this dispute as well.

3           247. This evolving, willful, and knowing deception has gone entirely unchallenged by  
4 the Union Defendants who are supposed to be guarding the best interests, including the financial  
5 interests and the contractual rights, of Plaintiffs and the Class.

6           248. United has taken this a step further by telling Plaintiffs and the Class that while there  
7 is undeniably an obligation to perform the calculation, this obligation does not extend or require it  
8 to substantiate that the calculation as done correctly.

9           249. For their part, the Union Defendants similarly refused to provide any information to  
10 the members or any grievant, initially parroting United's fabricated excuse that the information was  
11 confidential and proprietary. The union representatives pulled short of endorsing that position but  
12 did state repeatedly that because United said the information was confidential and proprietary, the  
13 Unions had no choice but to go along. All whilst knowing these statements were false.

14           250. The failure to substantiate the calculation in the face of obvious mathematical  
15 impossibilities, coupled with United's failure to produce any relevant material documents which  
16 have a substantial role in settling present contractual rights and obligations of the parties, has  
17 produced a situation in which Plaintiffs and Class do not know or fully understand what rights they  
18 currently enjoy as related to the CBA, including being paid their earned wages. Compounded by  
19 the Union Defendants abandonment, and United's apparent intent to destroy the Class' collective  
20 representation at United, the Class is unable to assert their rights, contract violations are not being  
21 reported or processed, and earned wages are being lost.

22           251. And while the grievance process is the proper place to address these legitimate and  
23 substantial claims, both United and the Unions have blocked every effort by Plaintiffs and other  
24 members of the Class, to have this matter resolved using that process.

25           252. This conduct has caused severe financial hardship for every affected Technician.  
26 For every nickel United deprives them of, it is almost \$1,000,000 dollars in United's coffers. A  
27 nickel (\$0.05) withheld from 9,600 technicians for a year's work (2080 straight time hours) equals  
28 \$998,400. United has deprived these dedicated men and women of anywhere from \$3.70 to \$7.35

1 every year for the last six years. Conservatively, this is approximately \$75 million dollars upwards  
2 of \$145 million dollars, every year for the last six years.

3 253. That this has been allowed to persist and increase as the years have gone on because  
4 of complicity with the Unions at least tacit blessing is a plausible claim for breach of the duty of  
5 fair representation, and a violation of their oath to the Teamsters' constitution, among other claims.

6 The Unions categorical refusal to provide any defense against what appears to be clear wage theft  
7 is incomprehensible and likely motivated by a desire to stymie the Class and protect the Unions  
8 position of power than it is any function of honest, rational, fair dealings.

## 10 VI. CLASS ALLEGATIONS

11 254. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all paragraphs of this Complaint as  
12 though fully set forth herein.

13 255. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class ("Class")  
14 defined below, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"), subs.(a) and (b)(3):

15 All current and former non-exempt hourly workers employed by United Airlines,  
16 Inc. in the Technician and Other Related bargaining unit, and based in the United  
17 States, at any time during the period from three-years prior to the filing of the  
original complaint in this action through the date of final judgment.

18 256. For purposes of this Complaint, "Plaintiff Mullins" or "Plaintiff Scholz" shall refer  
19 to that particular Plaintiff only and "Plaintiffs" will refer to them collectively. Reference to the  
20 "Class" shall be deemed to include the Plaintiffs and each member of the Class.

21 257. Plaintiffs reserve the right to establish subclasses as appropriate.

22 258. Excluded from the Class are any Defendant, any parent companies, subsidiaries,  
23 affiliates, officers, directors, legal representatives, co-conspirators, or agents, and any member of  
24 the immediate family of, and any heirs, successors or assigns of, any such excluded party.

25 259. Ascertainability and Numerosity. This action has been brought, and may properly  
26 be maintained, as a class action under Rule 23 because there is a well-defined community of interest  
27 in the litigation and the proposed class members are easily ascertainable, clearly defined, and can  
28 be identified and notified efficiently from reference to existing, objective criteria such as records

1 maintained by Defendants. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule  
2 23(a)(1) as Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, the potential members of the  
3 Class as defined herein is comprised of thousands of persons and is so numerous that joinder of all  
4 persons would be impracticable. The Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail,  
5 or other appropriate media.

6 260. Commonality. This action is maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(a)(2) and  
7 (b)(3), as there is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of law and fact that  
8 predominate over any question affecting only individual members of the Class. These common  
9 legal and factual questions, which do not vary from members of the Class, and which may be  
10 determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any members of the Class, include,  
11 but are not limited, to the following:

12 (a) Whether any Union Defendants' conduct in providing representation to Plaintiffs  
13 and the Class related to the 2022 LOA#29 Adjustment Calculation ("Adjustment Calculation") was  
14 arbitrary, in bad faith, or discriminatory;

15 (b) Whether any Union Defendants' policies or procedures in reviewing, reporting, and  
16 disclosing the Adjustment Calculation results breached a duty of fair representation to the Class as  
17 required under the RLA and the Unions' governing documents;

18 (c) Whether any Union Defendant's practices related to grievance processing, including  
19 access to the higher stages of the process, breach duties of fair representation owed to the Class as  
20 required under the RLA, the CBA, the Unions' governing documents;

21 (d) Whether any Union Defendant violated the constitution of the Teamsters or the  
22 bylaws of Local 986, or the RLA, in failing to put to a vote for ratification material changes to the  
23 collective bargaining agreement the Unions entered into with United;

24 (e) Whether any Union Defendant secretly agreed to permit the United to pay less than  
25 the earned, owed, and due wages to the Class, in violation of the common law, the CBA, the RLA,  
26 and the Unions' governing documents;

27 (f) Whether United Defendants provided the correct Adjustment Calculation to the  
28 Plaintiffs, and if not, the reasons therefor;

1 (g) Whether United secretly paid wages less than the agreed upon rate agreed upon, and  
2 according to, the CBA to each member of the Class for all hours worked;

3 (h) Whether any failure to pay all wages due was willful, intentional, and knowingly;

4 (i) Whether any Defendant's administration of the grievance process deprives any  
5 member of the Class their statutory due process rights by preventing access to, participation in, and  
6 completion of the grievance process;

7 (j) Whether any of the Defendants have engaged in a fraudulent scheme and/or artifice  
8 to defraud the Class of earned, owed, and due wages.

9 261. Typicality. This action is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3),  
10 as Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all other members of the Class as all Class members  
11 are similarly affected by Defendants' wrongful conduct in violation of federal and state law that  
12 are complained of herein. The claims also arise from the same course of conduct and Plaintiffs seek  
13 the same types of penalties, and other relief, on the same theories and legal grounds as the Class.

14 262. Adequacy of Representation: This action is maintainable as a class action pursuant  
15 to Rule 23(a)(4), as Plaintiffs are members of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the  
16 interests of Class members because: (1) their interests do not conflict with the interest of the  
17 individual members of the Class they seek to represent; (2) they have retained counsel competent  
18 and experienced in employment class action litigation; and (3) they intend to prosecute this action  
19 vigorously. Plaintiffs have incurred, and during the pendency of this action will continue to incur,  
20 costs and attorney's fees, that have been, are, and will be necessarily expended for the prosecution  
21 of this action for the substantial benefit of each class member. Furthermore, class action treatment  
22 of this lawsuit will advance public policy objectives. Defendants in this class action violate  
23 employment and labor laws every day. Current employees and union members are often afraid to  
24 assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Class actions provide class members  
25 who are not named in the complaint anonymity and allow for the vindication of their rights while  
26 lessening the aforementioned fear; it is also efficient and economical for the parties and the courts.

27 263. The amount in controversy for the aggregate claims of the Proposed Class exceeds  
28 five million dollars (\$5,000,000.00).



VII. CAUSES OF ACTION

**Count I – Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation**  
**In Violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45, U.S.C. §§ 151-188**  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class Against All Union Defendants)**

264. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

265. The general duty of fair representation arises from the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–152; Laturner v. Burlington N., Inc., 501 F.2d 593, 599 n. 12 (9th Cir.1974). The duty of fair representation requires the Unions to “serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). A union breaches this duty when its conduct toward a member is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Jones v. Union Pac. R.R., 968 F.2d 937, 941 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). If the union acts with “egregious disregard for the rights of union members,” the union has violated the duty to fairly represent. Peters v Burlington, 931 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). If a grievance is “important and meritorious,” a union must provide a “more substantial reason for abandoning it.” Gregg v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Union Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015, 1016 (1983) (merits of the grievance are relevant to the sufficiency of the unions representations). A collective bargaining representative has no authority to bargain away vested rights without an employee's consent. *See e.g.*, Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181 n. 20 (1971). “Where the Union actions are governed by its interpretation of contractual provisions, bad faith may exist if the Union maintains an illegitimate contract interpretation and prevents employees from using established grievance procedures to challenge the interpretation.” Stupy v. U.S. Postal Service, 951 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.).

266. By the acts alleged herein, the Unions breached owed duties of fair representation to Plaintiffs and the Class by acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily, and in bad faith. Among other things, the Union Defendants, the Teamsters and Local 986:

(a) improperly consented to material modifications to the CBA, including LOA #29, without a ratification vote, as required by the Teamsters constitution;

1 (b) secretly agreed to alter, modify, and/or reduce the Adjustment Calculation result for  
2 the United Defendants financial gain by secretly agreeing, and permitting the raise United was  
3 contractually bound to give the Class was \$1.20 and not \$7.35;

4 (c) concealed from the Class knowledge and proof the computation for the Adjustment  
5 Calculation was significantly higher than reported;

6 (d) failed to demand United bargain over these reductions, or any changes, unilaterally  
7 imposed by the United Defendants to the contractually agreed upon wages during the term of the CBA,  
8 including failing to put any such material changes to the mandatory ratification vote of the Class, as  
9 required by the Teamsters constitution;

10 (e) failed to take any steps to protect the best interests of the Class, and safeguard their  
11 rights, without any legitimate union objective, from United's stated insistence to unilaterally change the  
12 wage rules and other terms of the CBA, including LOA #29;

13 (f) failed to reasonably promote the best interests of the Class, without any legitimate union  
14 objective, by knowingly disseminating false statements, knowingly furnishing inaccurate information,  
15 and intentionally misrepresenting information, regarding raise and grievance processing;

16 (g) failed to consider the interpretation of the Adjustment Calculation urged by Plaintiffs  
17 and the Class, or investigate the facts consistent with their positions, instead insisted on factually  
18 inconsistent and contradictory positions, and put forward false, material statements, with egregious  
19 disregard for the rights of, and to the detriment of, Plaintiffs and the Class in order to favor United;

20 (h) failed to challenge United's illegitimate CBA interpretations of LOA#29, including that  
21 any part of the Adjustment Calculation was to be estimated, approximated, or ignored, while also  
22 preventing Plaintiffs from using the agreed upon, and established contractual grievance procedures to  
23 challenge those interpretations in order to assist United in its unlawful behavior;

24 (i) failed to challenge United's illegitimate assertion that any part of LOA#29 is, or ever  
25 was, confidential or proprietary, including any of the required inputs to perform the Adjustment  
26 Calculation, any resultant output of the Adjustment Calculation, or the Cost Model, while also  
27 preventing Plaintiffs from using the agreed upon, and established contractual grievance procedures to  
28 challenge those interpretations in order to assist United in its unlawful behavior;

1 (j) failed to enforce United's agreed to obligation to provide requested, relevant, material  
2 information related to the processing of Plaintiffs grievances, including refusing to file a claim against  
3 United for failing to do so; and

4 (k) extinguished Plaintiffs' rights to pursue their grievances regarding the owed wages by  
5 unilaterally, and without any legitimate reason, reasonable explanation, or prior adequate notice of,  
6 justification for, or consent, by withdrawing Plaintiffs' grievances and not providing the written demand  
7 to United to initiate the Third Step of the grievance process as requested by Plaintiffs.

8 267. The Union Defendants have threatened, deprived, and interfered with the Class' owed  
9 wages by illegitimately and unfairly reducing the bargained for wages agreed to by the parties in the  
10 CBA between the Class and United that the CBA was meant to deliver and rendering the agreed to, and  
11 statutorily required grievance process completely unavailable and inaccessible to Plaintiffs, one of the  
12 parties the process was directly created to benefit.

13 268. As a result, neither Plaintiffs nor the Class can enforce, or remedy, the substantiated  
14 breaches of the CBA carried out on a routine basis by United for which Plaintiffs and the Class suffer  
15 severe financial hardships.

16 269. The acts described in this Complaint, and above, relating to numerous dishonesties in  
17 calculating wage increases, systemic interference with the contractual grievance process to favor  
18 United, as well as the reckless disregard for the right of the Class to be paid their contractual wage for  
19 having diligently performed their work violates the RLA and state law.

20 270. When unions fail to provide adequate notice of or justification for a decision to  
21 withdraw an employee's grievance, courts have found that the union acted arbitrarily in violation  
22 of the duty of fair representation. Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1091  
23 (9th Cir. 1978).

24 271. Union Defendants officials admitted the result was arbitrarily altered and manipulated  
25 at the direction of, and for the express benefit of, United. Such an abandonment of their duties to the  
26 Class is unlawful and Plaintiffs seek relief for all available and applicable damages.

27 272. As a direct and proximate result of the Unions breach of the duty of fair representation,  
28 the Class has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

1                                    **Count II – Breach of Contract, Third Party Beneficiary**  
2                                    **In Violation Of California Civil Code, § 1559**  
3                                    **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class Against All Union Defendants)**

4            273. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all paragraphs of this Complaint as  
5 though fully set forth herein.

6            274. On information and belief, on or before, February 5, 2017, the Union Defendants  
7 entered into a written contract with Dan Akins, an actuary. The contract involved performing the  
8 LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation referenced herein, creating an Excel version of the Cost Model,  
9 and analyzing the calculation utilizing the Cost Model referenced herein, in order to determine, and  
10 confirm, the accurate, resultant wage increase for the Class under LOA #29, which Akins would  
11 report to the Union Defendants to inform the Class of their raise, for which Akins was paid by the  
12 Teamsters.

13            275. The contract was for the benefit of the Class because only the Class were to receive  
14 the raise determined through Dan Akins' performance.

15            276. On information and belief, Dan Akins performed his obligations under the contract  
16 in that he performed the calculation and reported the results to the Union Defendants.

17            277. The Union Defendants failed to perform their obligations under the contract in that  
18 they falsified the results arrived at by Akins in performing the calculation, reported an inaccurate  
19 calculation result to the Class, misrepresenting the false result as Akins true result.

20            278. As a result of the Union Defendant's non-performance under the contract Plaintiff,  
21 and the Class, have suffered damages in that their raise was grossly unreported, all to the Class'  
22 detriment, damaging the Class in an estimated sum at present of over \$156,000,000 million dollars.  
23 Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to the full measure of damages of all categories permissible under  
24 applicable law and in an amount according to proof.

25                                    **Count III – Breach of Contract**  
26                                    **Failure To Exert Every Reasonable Effort To Make And Maintain Agreements**  
27                                    **In Violation Of The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First, Seventh**  
28                                    **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class Against All United Defendants)**

29            279. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all paragraphs of this Complaint as  
30 though fully set forth herein.

1           280. Railway Labor Act Section 102 First provides “[i]t shall be the duty of all carriers,  
2 their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain  
3 agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions . . . .”, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First. **A  
4 failure to perform the obligations undertaken in a collective bargaining agreement constitutes  
5 breach of that contract. Scribner v. WorldCom, Inc., 249 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2001). The  
6 Supreme Court has held that the requirement of Section 102 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First is a legal  
7 obligation that is judicially enforceable. Chicago and North Western Railway Co. v. United  
8 Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).**

9           281. Section 102 Seventh of the Act states, “[n]o carrier shall change the rates of pay,  
10 rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the  
11 manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of [the RLA].” 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh.

12           282. **Failure to pay contracted wages is an enforceable action for breach of contract. *See*  
13 Scribner v. Worldcom, Inc., 249 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir.2001) (remarking that Commentary on the  
14 Second Restatement of Contracts “provide[s] that [g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a  
15 contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified  
16 expectations of the other party . . . [and] that [s]ubterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of  
17 good faith in performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified”) (internal  
18 quotation marks omitted).**

19           283. By intentionally altering, falsifying, and misrepresenting the LOA #29 Adjustment  
20 Calculation result for financial gain, United has failed to exert every reasonable effort to maintain  
21 the agreement, in violation of Railway Labor Act Section 102 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First, and has  
22 “unilaterally changed the rates of pay, pay rules, or working conditions of its employees” in  
23 violation of Railway Labor Act Section 102 Seventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh.

24           284. By failing to respond within a reasonable time to Plaintiffs’ communications which  
25 sought to abide by the grievance process set forth in the CBA for the Third Step (System Board of  
26 Adjustment) of the grievance process, or process timely notification and request by Plaintiffs to  
27 initiate this next step of the grievance process, United abandoned and repudiated the agreed to, and  
28 required, grievance process in violation of Railway Labor Act Section 102 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152

1 First. Rather than making a good faith attempt to address the merits of the dispute, United poisoned  
2 the process, with the Unions assistance, in refusing to convene the Third Step System Board of  
3 Adjustment.

4 285. The United Defendants secret agreements with the Union Defendants contrary to  
5 the terms of the in-force CBA, in an effort to unilaterally change the written terms of the CBA, is  
6 a violation of Railway Labor Act Section 102 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First and Seventh.

7 286. The United Defendants cannot unilaterally add terms to the CBA. The CBA must  
8 be conspicuously and purposefully amended, including any letters of agreement, by bargaining and  
9 ratification vote. By unilaterally altering the agreed to LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation as  
10 expressly provided for in the CBA, and LOA #29, without bargaining or ratification vote, United  
11 has violated Railway Labor Act Section 102 Seventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh, and this failure to  
12 pay contractual wages pursuant to the terms of the CBA is enforceable as breach of the CBA in  
13 violation of Railway Labor Act Section 102 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152 first.

14 287. By refusing to process Plaintiffs' legitimate grievances through the Third Step of  
15 the contractually mandated grievance process, by ignoring and abandoning the grievance process  
16 promulgated in the CBA, for grievances making a good faith attempt to address the merits of the  
17 issues related to the LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation, United has failed to exert every reasonable  
18 effort to maintain the agreement, in violation of RLA § 2, First, 45 U.S.C. § 152, and is in breach.

19 288. United has engaged in a tactic of refusing reasonable information requests that are  
20 related to enforcement of the CBA. These refusals are calculated to, or have the foreseeable effect  
21 of, avoiding complying with the CBA for the United Defendants financial gain at the expense of  
22 Plaintiffs and the Class and demonstrate legitimately participating in the grievance process is mere  
23 pretext.

24 289. United's conduct and unwillingness to honestly administer the grievance process is  
25 a violation under the Railway Labor Act Section 102 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First. By deploying this  
26 tactic of refusing reasonable information or document requests related to the enforcement and  
27 administration of the CBA, United's true purpose is to convey or imply an unwillingness to reach  
28 agreement with, and to undermine, Local 986 in order to undermine the chosen representatives of

1 the Class, and to force Local 986 to acquiesce to United's demands to not process the grievances,  
2 all for United's interests and at the expense of Plaintiffs, the Class, and Local 986 and contrary to  
3 the terms of the CBA.

4 290. By and through this conduct, United has demonstrated an intent not to follow the  
5 express terms of the CBA, and to not reach a mutual agreement regarding these grievances but  
6 rather to delay and frustrate the grievance process, and to impose unnecessary cost and hardship on  
7 Plaintiffs in order to force Local 986 to acquiesce to United's unilateral demand to reduce Plaintiffs  
8 raise. By and through this conduct, United has and remains in violation of 45 U.S.C. § 152, First.

9 291. As a party to the CBA entered into with United, the Class have a right to information  
10 as to United's performance under the CBA, including a right to information United contractually  
11 agreed to provide when determining whether United is adhering to all terms and conditions of the  
12 CBA. United's refusal to provide requested relevant, material information related to a grievance  
13 filed by Plaintiffs grieving a violation of United's performance under the CBA, is a violation of  
14 Railway Labor Act Section 102 First, and United is in breach of the CBA.

15 292. As a direct and proximate result of the breaches of the CBA by United, the Class  
16 have been damaged by the loss of a significant amount of wages in a sum the Class would have  
17 earned under the CBA had United not breached in an amount to be determined according to proof.

18 **Count IV - Interference With The Designated Representative**  
19 **In Violation of RLA 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third, and Fourth**  
20 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class Against All United Defendants)**

21 293. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all paragraphs of this Complaint as  
22 though fully set forth herein.

23 294. Under Section 102 Third of the RLA, a carrier is prohibited from "in any way  
24 interfer[ing] with, influenc[ing], or coerc[ing]" the employees in their "choice of representatives."  
25 45 U.S.C. § 152 Third. "Influence," as used in Section 102 of the RLA, means pressure, use of  
26 authority to induce action or to corrupt or override the will of another. Texas & N.O.R. Co. v.  
27 Brotherhood of R. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). This requirement is judicially enforceable  
28 because noninterference with employees' chosen representation is a statutory right crucial to the  
RLA's functioning. Id.; see also Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n., 300 U.S. 515, 545-46, (1937).

1           295.   The Section 102 Fourth of the Act, provides in part:

2           No carrier, its officers, or agents shall deny or in any way question the right of its  
3           employees to join, organize, or assist in organizing the labor organization of their  
4           choice, and it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the  
5           organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or  
6           assisting or contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other  
7           agency of collective bargaining, or in performing any work therefor, or to influence  
8           or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or  
9           remain members of any labor organization, ... .

10           45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth.

11           296.   By frustrating and undermining the effectiveness of the Union Defendants in  
12           administering the CBA through asserting baseless and non-existent CBA wage rules, terms, and  
13           conditions, i.e., LOA #29 permitted United to unilaterally reduce the members wages without any  
14           substantiation because such conduct involved highly confidential and proprietary information that  
15           United was not required to divulge, followed up by using the grievance process as the guise to  
16           undermine the effectiveness of the Union Defendants in challenging those actions, United has  
17           violated Section 2, Third of the RLA. *See Fennessy v. Sw. Airlines*, 91 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (9th  
18           Cir. 1996).

19           297.   By and through its conduct of exerting economic pressure on the Union Defendants,  
20           and the Class to undermine the integrity of the Unions and the ability to bargain on the employees’  
21           behalf and in effect coerce the Class into decertifying the Union Defendants, the United Defendants  
22           compromised the Union Defendants representation by their conduct in violation of RLA Section  
23           102 Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth.

24           298.   By demanding the Union Defendants agree to the contractual reduction of the raise,  
25           by demanding changes to the terms and conditions of the CBA without bargaining or a ratification  
26           vote, United interfered with employee rights to freely associate under the RLA. The CBA mandates  
27           United must provide the Unions with relevant information necessary for the proper performance of  
28           its duties as exclusive bargaining representatives. Exhibit 3, art. 19.E.3; *see also Detroit Edison Co.*  
          *v. NLRB*, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979). The United Defendants “duty to bargain unquestionably  
          extends beyond the period of contract negotiations and applies to labor-management relations  
          during the term of an agreement.” *NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.*, 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967).



**Count V – Violation of Statutory Due Process**  
**In Violation of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45, U.S.C. § 184.**  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class Against All Defendants)**

299. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

300. The Fifth Amendment directs that before a governmental actor may deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property,” it must first afford that person “due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. V. The interests at stake in Railway Labor Act proceedings are “property” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1936).

301. Section 204 of the RLA, governs resolution of disputes as applied to the airline industry, providing for a compulsory remedy of a system adjustment board:

“The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers by air growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions ... shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to an appropriate adjustment board ... .”

45 U.S.C. § 184.

302. Under Section 204 of the RLA therefore, an individual air carrier employee has a statutory right to due process before an adjustment board. 45 U.S.C. § 184. When a dispute arises between “an employee” and “a carrier” concerning the interpretation of labor agreements, and is not amicably resolved, “either party” may unilaterally bring that dispute before the adjustment board. 45 U.S.C. § 184. Any attempt to deny such a right is unenforceable and invalid. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963).

303. The Ninth Circuit has in fact found there is no clear evidence of congressional intent to remove the right of due process protection from RLA governed proceedings. Edelman v. Western Airlines, 892 F.2d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 1989). It follows then that preservation of due process right permits Plaintiffs to enforce its deprivation, with or without their union. Fennessy v. S.W. Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (without judicial recognition of a claim based on the statutory dictates of the RLA, there would be no remedy to enforce the statutory commands of the RLA, ...

1 because the claim arises under a statute and not the CBA, such a claim may be brought directly to  
2 district court.).

3 304. Article 19 of the CBA provides for a System Board of Adjustment, in the event a Second  
4 Step grievance resolution is unsatisfactory, at Third Step of the grievance process. Article 20 provides  
5 for neutral, or a Board of Arbitration, for the final step of the grievance process. Exhibit 3, art. 19.

6 305. Nothing in the Article 19, or any other provision in the CBA, waives, or otherwise  
7 excludes Plaintiffs and the Class to their statutory right to access and utilize these higher stages of the  
8 congressionally mandated grievance process. Nor is there any provision in the CBA giving the Union  
9 exclusive authority to effectuate the grievance process; the CBA does state the Union “may” effectuate  
10 the process. Plaintiffs requested, in writing, that their grievances be advanced to the Third Step to  
11 continue the challenging their claims that they were underpaid. *See* Exhibit 3.

12 306. By refusing to allow Plaintiffs to complete the congressionally mandated grievance  
13 process for a grievance arising under the CBA, and by refusing to initiate the Third Step System Board  
14 of Adjustment as provided for under the CBA for such purpose, all Defendants are violating Section  
15 204 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 184, and depriving Plaintiffs of their statutory due process.

16 307. As set forth above, the Unions and United inhibited, prohibited, and refused to make  
17 available to Plaintiffs this required step in the grievance process in order to exhaust their mandated  
18 contractual dispute resolution process independently despite Plaintiffs timely written requests to invoke  
19 these procedures to resolve their grievances as the statute dictates.

20 308. The Defendants, unilaterally and arbitrarily, through their own conduct or by secret  
21 agreement, sought to divest and deprive Plaintiffs of their statutorily prescribed rights over such a  
22 dispute, in violation of the RLA, as well as sought to divest and deprive the unique system boards with  
23 the statutorily prescribed jurisdiction over a dispute, in violation of the RLA.

24 309. While the Union Defendants may not have wanted to represent Plaintiffs in the higher  
25 stages of the grievance process, their decision not to does not bar Plaintiffs from so doing. A “union’s  
26 exclusive control over the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented” is  
27 inconsistent with the full protection of substantive individual statutory rights. Alexander v. Gardner-  
28 Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974). Air carrier employees covered by the RLA have a statutory

1 right to process their grievances individually under the RLA. Pyles v. United Airlines, Inc., 79 F.3d  
2 1046, 1052 (11th Cir. 1996) (*citing* Stevens v. Teamsters Local 2707, Airline, Aerospace & Allied  
3 Emp., 504 F. Supp. 332, 334 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (individual airline employee entitled to convene  
4 special boards of adjustment as a matter of statutory right without union assistance); *see also* Elgin,  
5 Joliet, & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 740 n. 39 (1945) (individual statutory rights for RLA  
6 employees “cannot be nullified merely by agreement between the carrier and the union”); Pratt v.  
7 United Airlines, 468 F.Supp 508, 513 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (under the RLA, the union does not have  
8 exclusive control over grievances).

9 310. Furthermore, the failure of the Union Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with any prior  
10 warning or notice such a drastic step of withdrawing and permanently terminating their grievances  
11 would be taken, without giving Plaintiffs any opportunity to assume responsibility for these grievances  
12 individually as provided for under the statute, violates the RLA. Consequently, Plaintiffs grievances,  
13 which could be remedied through the grievance process to the Plaintiffs’ benefit were it not for the  
14 Defendant Unions blocking Plaintiffs from the grievance process, were effectively resolved in favor of  
15 United, at Plaintiffs’ expense, categorically foreclosing Plaintiffs from any relief.

16 311. But for the general jurisdiction of the federal courts, there would not be a remedy to  
17 enforce the statutory commands Congress has written into the RLA to adjudicate such grievances. The  
18 congressionally mandated arbitral remedial was not designed to shield employers from the natural  
19 consequences of their breaches of bargaining agreements by wrongful union conduct in the enforcement  
20 of such agreements.

21 312. Plaintiffs request the Court declare that the Class have the statutory right to access and  
22 complete the grievance process independently pursuant to, and in accordance with the Railway Labor  
23 Act, and congressional intent.

24 313. Plaintiffs have been deprived of their right to due process, suffering significant damages  
25 for which the Unions and United are liable to the Class for and therefore, the Class is entitled to the full  
26 measure of damages of all categories permissible under applicable law and in an amount according to  
27 proof.  
28

**Count VI – Fraud and Intent to Deceive  
In Violation of California Civil Code §§ 1709 and 1710.  
(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class Against All Defendants)**

1  
2  
3 314. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all paragraphs of this Complaint as  
4 though fully set forth herein.

5 315. Defendants willfully and intentionally engaged in fraudulent concealment and deceit  
6 as defined by the California Civil Code §§ 1709 and 1710, in failing to disclose the true results of  
7 the LOA#29 Adjustment Calculation result to the Class, on which they would reasonably rely, so  
8 as to deprive them of significant owed wages.

9 316. All Defendants concealed from, and failed to disclose to the Class that Defendants  
10 statements related to the result of the LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation were false when Defendants  
11 made them to the Class, as the true LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation result despite the truth of all  
12 of the related communications regarding the result having been known to them, and only to them.  
13 No one in the Class could discover the true facts regarding the LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation,  
14 such as the LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation result was artificially adjusted for the Defendants’  
15 financial gain, because all of the related relevant material facts were purposely withheld from them.

16 317. The Union Defendants had a duty to disclose truthfully all facts to the Class, in their  
17 roles as exclusive bargaining representatives.

18 318. All Defendants had superior knowledge of the LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation  
19 true result because the Defendants were the only parties allowed in the November 22, 2022 meeting  
20 with the actuary tasked with performing the LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation, Dan Akins, where  
21 the true LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation results were disclosed and discussed.

22 319. Teamsters Airline Division then Deputy Director, Bob Fisher, admitted intentionally  
23 misleading and deceiving the Class of the true LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation result, and the  
24 confidential nature of the Adjustment Calculation and the Cost Model, during a craft meeting for  
25 Local 210, in Newark, New Jersey on November 29, 2022.

26 320. Likewise, Local 856 Business Agent, Javier Lectora, admitted to Plaintiff Scholz to  
27 intentionally misleading and deceiving the Class of the true LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation result  
28 on February 7, 2022, during a conversation at United’s SFO Maintenance Facility.

1           321. All Defendants knew, understood, and intended that the concealment of the true  
2 LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation result would cause severe financial harm to the Class by United  
3 withholding earned, due, and owed wages belonging to them. Because all Defendants secretly  
4 entered into side deals in order to deprive the Class of earned and owed wages, this claim is not  
5 premised on the CBA, or any interpretation of it, but instead on the deceit and dishonestly of all  
6 Defendants.

7           322. The Class members reasonably and justifiably relied on the Defendants to perform  
8 the LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation honestly, accurately, and according to its terms. The Class  
9 reasonably believed the Defendants would not act illegally or put the Class at risk of substantial  
10 and continuing financial harm.

11           323. The Class reasonably and justifiably relied on Defendants' statements that they had  
12 performed the LOA #29 Adjustment Calculation honestly, accurately, and according to its terms  
13 when Defendants provided statements claiming to have so performed the calculation and providing  
14 the result as 2.6% or approximately \$1.20 per hour wage increase.

15           324. Despite having actual knowledge these statements were false and nothing more than  
16 a scheme to defraud the Class of their earned, due, and owed wage increases when made to them,  
17 all Defendants continued to recklessly make, and repeat, these false statements.

18           325. All Defendants concealed the true facts from the Class by providing false documents  
19 and recklessly stating that the required information for the LOA#29 Adjustment Calculation was  
20 proprietary and therefore could not be provided to the Class. These acts were done intentionally  
21 and willfully with the actual intent to deceive the Class, to conceal the true nature of the above-  
22 referenced material facts.

23           326. The Defendants concealment was continuous, and continues today, and has caused  
24 great economic losses, distress, and harms to the Class.

25           327. As a result of the deceptions and concealments of facts, the Class suffered significant  
26 damages for which all Defendants are liable to the Class for the full measure of damages of all  
27 categories permissible under applicable law in an amount according to proof.  
28

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, the individual Plaintiffs named above, on behalf of themselves and the Class, respectfully pray this Court accept jurisdiction of this action and grant Plaintiffs’ demand:

- A. For certification of Plaintiffs’ claims as a class action pursuant to Rule 23;
- B. For Plaintiffs to be appointed as Class Representatives;
- C. For Plaintiffs’ counsel to be appointed as Class Counsel;
- D. For compensatory damages in an amount according to proof with interest thereon;
- E. For such other general, special, or punitive damages as may be appropriate;
- F. For an order directing the Defendants to cease from further refusal to allow the Class access the congressionally mandated and contractually required grievance process;
- G. For pre-judgment, and post judgment, interest, at the legal rate;
- H. For an award of attorney’s fees and costs as permitted by applicable law; and
- I. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just, proper, and equitable.

**IX. JURY TRIAL DEMAND**

Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial as provided by Rule 38 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated: June 24, 2024

LAW OFFICE OF JANE C. MARIANI

By: /s/ Jane C. Mariani  
JANE C. MARIANI,  
jcm@marianiadvocacy.com  
Law Office Of Jane C. Mariani  
584 Castro Street, #687  
San Francisco, CA 94114  
Tel.: (415) 203-2453

*Attorney for Plaintiffs,*  
THOMAS NEAL MULLINS  
JOHN R. SCHOLZ, III

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE**

I, Jane C. Mariani, hereby certify that on June 24, 2024, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of electronic filing to the CM/ECF registrants for this case.

Dated: June 24, 2024

LAW OFFICE OF JANE C. MARIANI

By: /s/ Jane C. Mariani  
JANE C. MARIANI,  
jcm@marianiadvocacy.com  
Law Office Of Jane C. Mariani  
584 Castro Street, #687  
San Francisco, CA 94114  
Tel.: (415) 203-2453

*Attorney for Plaintiffs,*  
THOMAS NEAL MULLINS  
JOHN R. SCHOLZ, III